Lecture of the Winter Semester 1772–1773 based on the transcription Collins, Philippi, Hamilton, Brauer, Dohna, Parow, and Euchel

Summary

PROLEGOMENA

The science of the human being (anthropology) has a similarity to the physiology of outer sense, insofar as in both the grounds of cognition are drawn from observation and experience. Nothing indeed appears to be more interesting for the human being than this science, and yet none is more neglected than precisely this one. The blame for this probably lies in the difficulty of undertaking this species of observation, as also in the odd illusion that one believes himself to know that with which he is accustomed to dealing. For in some sciences important parts have thereby been withdrawn from consideration, because one did not consider them worthy of it. One cause might be that one conjectures he would not find much to rejoice at if he were to undertake the difficult descent into Hell toward the knowledge of himself.

But why has no connected science of human beings been made out of the great stock of observations made by English authors? It appears to come from this: one has considered the science of human beings as a dependent part of metaphysics, and has therefore applied only as much attention to it as the larger parts of metaphysics permitted. This mistake has perhaps arisen out of the error that in metaphysics one must take everything out of himself, so that one has regarded all parts of metaphysics as consequences of the doctrine of the soul. But metaphysics has nothing to do with experiential cognitions. Empirical psychology belongs to metaphysics just as little as empirical physics does. – If we regard the knowledge of human beings as a special science, then many advantages arise from this; since 1) for love of it one need not learn the whole of metaphysics. 2) before a science comes into order and regularity of disposition, it must be pursued in academies alone; this is the only means of bringing a science to a certain height; but this cannot take place if the science is not precisely separated. One does not retain anything from books for which one has no pigeonholes, as it were, in one's understanding. The disposition is therefore in a science the most excellent thing; if one has this from the natural cognition of human beings, then one would collect inestimable reflections and observations from novels and periodicals, from all writings and from all one's dealings.