The Congo Crisis, 1960–1965

Elizabeth Schmidt

doi:10.1017/CBO9781139021371.005

3 - The Congo Crisis, 1960–1965

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013

Elizabeth Schmidt

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Elizabeth Schmidt: Affiliation:
Loyola University Maryland

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As the superpowers vied for influence in North Africa and the Middle East, the Belgian Congo became the next African battleground. Bordered by nine other territories in Central, Southern, and East Africa, the Congo was of fundamental political and economic concern to colonial and Cold War powers, the white-minority regimes of Southern Africa, and African and Asian countries in the UN. It was extremely rich in strategic minerals, containing some of the world's most significant deposits of copper, cobalt, and uranium (Katanga Province) and industrial diamonds (South Kasai Province), as well as important sources of tantalum, tin, and zinc. Belgium's most powerful financial group, Société Générale de Belgique, and its affiliates controlled approximately 70 percent of the Congolese national economy, including the Katanga mines, which were dominated by the Belgian-British joint venture Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

During the period 1960–65, the Congo was the target of significant intervention by external actors, some of it under UN auspices. Belgium, the former colonial power, and the United States, the preeminent Cold War player, had especially critical roles, while African nations contributed troops and material aid, primarily through the UN. Although the Soviet Union and Cuba were also involved, compared to that of the West, their role was marginal and their actions ineffective. Foreign commercial interests from Belgium, Britain, the United States, South Africa, and the Central African Federation were deeply embroiled in the conflict, largely in support of the secessionist movement in Katanga. Regional political interests also came into play as the white-ruled regimes of the Central African Federation and South Africa, along with Portugal as the dominant neighboring colonial power, attempted to contain the spread of radical nationalism by undermining the Congo's central government.

Type: Chapter
Information: Foreign Intervention in Africa
From the Cold War to the War on Terror
, pp. 56 - 77

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139021371.005 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2013

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References

For an overview of the Congo Crisis, three books are especially recommended. Weissman's, Stephen R.American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974) remains one of the best in-depth scholarly analyses of the crisis. Chapter 5 of William Minter's King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1986) offers a concise and accessible overview, examining the key actors and their political and economic interests. Piero Gleijeses's Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) explores the 1964–65 rebellion and its aftermath, examining the roles of the UN, Western powers, and Cuba.

For general historical background, two books are recommended. Hochschild's, AdamKing Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998) tells the story of colonial conquest, exploitation, and contemporary human rights protests that altered the course of the Congo's history. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja's The Congo from Leopold to Kabila (London: Zed Books, 2002) is a highly readable historical overview by a leading Congolese scholar.

For Lumumba's political thought, see Lumumba, Patrice, Congo, My Country (New York: Praeger, 1962).

Several important scholarly accounts written immediately after the crisis provide insight into the interests and objectives of Congolese political actors, Western powers, the Soviet Union, African nations, and the UN. See Hoskyns, Catherine, The Congo since Independence, January 1960–December 1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); René Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982; first published, 1964); Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).

The role of the UN has been explored by both scholars and participants. Kent's, JohnAmerica, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (New York: Routledge, 2010) shows how the UN helped to preserve the existing social and economic order. Carole Collins's article “Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the Congo Crisis of 1960,” Africa Today 39, no. 3 (1992): 5–22, focuses on Andrew Cordier, the American diplomat who served as the first head of the UN operation. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian diplomat who replaced Cordier and was less sympathetic to Belgian and American interests, produced an insightful memoir, Mission for Hammarskjöld (London: Oxford University Press, 1976). Critical assessments of the UN operation are offered by political scientist David N. Gibbs and by Irish diplomat Conor Cruise O’Brien, who represented the UN in Katanga. See David N. Gibbs, “Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960–1: A Reinterpretation,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1993): 163–74, and Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962).

Interpretations of the U.S. role are offered in a number of studies based on declassified government documents, interviews, and other primary sources. In addition to Weissman (mentioned above), the most useful include Kalb, Madeleine G., The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982); William Minter, “Candid Cables: Some Reflections on U.S. Response to the Congo Rebellions, 1964,” in The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities, ed. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1986), 265–87; and Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). The influence of American business interests on the making of U.S.-Congo policy is explored in David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984).

In addition to Kalb (mentioned above), a number of works examine American and Belgian plots to assassinate Lumumba. The results of a U.S. congressional investigation are included in the “Church Committee Report”: U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). The CIA station chief, Lawrence Devlin, produced a memoir that provides new insights into the American covert operations: Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). Stephen R. Weissman's “An Extraordinary Rendition,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 2 (April 2010): 198–222, uses declassified U.S. government documents, memoirs of Belgian and American covert operatives, and interviews to provide a new interpretation of the American role in Lumumba's death. Ludo De Witte's The Assassination of Lumumba, trans. Ann Wright and Renée Fenby (New York: Verso, 2001) uses declassified Belgian government documents and interviews to expose the Belgian government's role in Lumumba's death. De Witte's book sparked a Belgian parliamentary inquiry (2000–1) and a formal apology to the Congolese people.

Several works explore the involvement of other colonial and regional powers. James's, AlanBritain and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) examines British economic interests in Katanga and political concerns about the region's future. Rosalynde Ainslie's The Unholy Alliance: Salazar-Verwoerd-Welensky (London: Columbia Printers, 1962) and Matthew Hughes's “Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis, 1958–1965,” International History Review 25, no. 3 (September 2003): 592–615, investigate the role of regional powers such as South Africa and the Central African Federation in the Congo Crisis.

Memoirs by white mercenaries include Hoare's, MikeCongo Warriors (London: Hale, 1991), which describes his experiences in Katanga in 1961–62 and Congo Mercenary (London: Hale, 1967; reprinted as The Road to Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary's Personal Memoir, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), which discusses his role in suppressing the Congo rebellion in 1964–65. Another account of the 1964–65 operations is Jerry Puren's Mercenary Commander (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1986).

Several works examine Soviet involvement, drawing on newly available Soviet-era archives. See Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy, Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006) and Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

Cuba's role is explored in Gleijeses's book (mentioned above) and two others with opposing perspectives. Ernesto “Che” Guevara's memoir, The Africa Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo, trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: Grove Press, 2000), describes his experiences as the leader of Cuban troops supporting the Lumumbist rebellion in eastern Congo in 1965. Frank Villafaña's book, Cold War in the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960–1967 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), explores the conflict in eastern Congo from the perspective of anti-Castro Cuban pilots provided to the central government by the CIA.

For the role of African and nonaligned countries see Nkrumah, Kwame, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1970) and Eberi Nwaubani, “Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 4 (October 2001): 599–622.

Weissman, Stephen R., American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 56Google Scholar

Nkrumah, Kwame, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 33Google Scholar

Westad, Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 36CrossRef Google Scholar

Guevara, Ernesto “Che”, The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo, trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: Grove Press, 2000), 244Google Scholar

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