Book contents
- A Farewell to Wars
- A Farewell to Wars
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Foreword
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Interstate Uses of Force, Tensions and Restraints by Regions since World War II
- 3 Interstate Uses of Force, Tensions and Restraints during Major Phases of International Relations since World War II
- 4 Incentives to the Interstate Uses of Force and Restraints
- 5 Historical Evolution of Norms and Other Means to Restrain the Use of Force
- 6 Overview of Disincentives to and Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force
- 7 Military Strength to Deter Others from Using Force
- 8 Nuclear and Other Non-conventional Weapons and Means as Deterrents and Threats
- 9 Disarmament as Restraint on the Use of Force
- 10 Preventing the Interstate Use of Force by Preventing or Solving Conflicts
- 11 Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force through Legal Norms
- 12 UN Charter Articles Relating to the Use of Force
- 13 The Security Council May Use or Authorize States or Regional Organizations to Use Force
- 14 The Right to Individual and Collective Self-Defence as an Exception to Art. 2:4
- 15 Interventions Triggered by Factors Unforeseen at the Adoption of the Charter’s Ban on the Interstate Use of Force
- 16 Interventions Seeking Regime Change, Protection of People or Punishment
- 17 Findings Regarding the Role of Norms to Restrain the Interstate Use of Force
- 18 States are Saying Farewell to Wars
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - Nuclear and Other Non-conventional Weapons and Means as Deterrents and Threats
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2023
- A Farewell to Wars
- A Farewell to Wars
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Foreword
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Interstate Uses of Force, Tensions and Restraints by Regions since World War II
- 3 Interstate Uses of Force, Tensions and Restraints during Major Phases of International Relations since World War II
- 4 Incentives to the Interstate Uses of Force and Restraints
- 5 Historical Evolution of Norms and Other Means to Restrain the Use of Force
- 6 Overview of Disincentives to and Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force
- 7 Military Strength to Deter Others from Using Force
- 8 Nuclear and Other Non-conventional Weapons and Means as Deterrents and Threats
- 9 Disarmament as Restraint on the Use of Force
- 10 Preventing the Interstate Use of Force by Preventing or Solving Conflicts
- 11 Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force through Legal Norms
- 12 UN Charter Articles Relating to the Use of Force
- 13 The Security Council May Use or Authorize States or Regional Organizations to Use Force
- 14 The Right to Individual and Collective Self-Defence as an Exception to Art. 2:4
- 15 Interventions Triggered by Factors Unforeseen at the Adoption of the Charter’s Ban on the Interstate Use of Force
- 16 Interventions Seeking Regime Change, Protection of People or Punishment
- 17 Findings Regarding the Role of Norms to Restrain the Interstate Use of Force
- 18 States are Saying Farewell to Wars
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Biological and chemical weapons are banned by treaty and attract less interest by the military than do nuclear and other modern means like cyber, space action and artificial intelligence. The number of nuclear weapons has gone down but there is no sign of their elimination through acceptance of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) or otherwise, nor is there any prospect of early common commitment to ‘non-first use’. Rather, at least the major nuclear-armed states regard their ability to inflict devastating second nuclear strikes as indispensable to deter any first strike and the ‘nuclear posture reviews of the US and Russia retain a good deal of freedom of action. We cannot at present see signs of zero nuclear and must agree with the conclusion that so long as nuclear weapons exist, there remains a risk of use – through misunderstandings or technical errors. We may also conclude that as cyber, space and other new means of struggle have become available, and capable of escalating, rendering conflicts increasingly unpredictable. It becomes implausible that any civilian or military leadership would allow itself to initiate or slide into conflict. It seems likely that they would choose intense competition by means other than force, notably economic and financial.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Farewell to WarsThe Growing Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force, pp. 126 - 143Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023