
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Guide to abbreviations in citations of sources
- Prologue
- 1 Stage setting in the presidential campaign of 1932
- 2 Curtain raising in the first hundred days
- 3 Deployments in the second half of 1933
- 4 Rethinking the structuralist agenda (I): The fate of NRA, 1934–35
- 5 Rethinking the structuralist agenda (II): The fate of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 1934–36
- 6 Rethinking macroeconomic strategies, 1934–36
- 7 Shock tremors and their repercussions, 1937–38
- 8 Toward a new “official model,” 1939–40
- 9 Designs for the management of an economy at war
- 10 Designs for the postwar world
- Epilogue
- Bibliographical note
- Index
Epilogue
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Guide to abbreviations in citations of sources
- Prologue
- 1 Stage setting in the presidential campaign of 1932
- 2 Curtain raising in the first hundred days
- 3 Deployments in the second half of 1933
- 4 Rethinking the structuralist agenda (I): The fate of NRA, 1934–35
- 5 Rethinking the structuralist agenda (II): The fate of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 1934–36
- 6 Rethinking macroeconomic strategies, 1934–36
- 7 Shock tremors and their repercussions, 1937–38
- 8 Toward a new “official model,” 1939–40
- 9 Designs for the management of an economy at war
- 10 Designs for the postwar world
- Epilogue
- Bibliographical note
- Index
Summary
Government isn't infallible by any means. Government is only beginning to learn a lot of these new tricks. We are all going to school.
– Franklin D. Roosevelt, remarks on his economic program during his 66th Press Conference, November 3, 1933For a dozen years, Roosevelt did indeed provide the nation with a “school” for economic learning. One of its by-products was the emergence of a home-grown variant on Keynesian doctrine that was to become an agenda-setter in policy debate. This perspective on the management of the economy was a far cry from the chaos of the “policy mix” with which his administration began in 1933. The new “model” appeared to be serviceable in providing intellectual leverage on problems of actual or potential underemployment, on the one hand, and problems of inflation containment, on the other. Moreover, economists in government contributed much more to its analytic refinement in these years than did their colleagues who operated exclusively from ivory towers.
While a Keynesian-style way of thinking set the pace in the framing of economic policy issues – post-1940 – it by no means followed that its champions prevailed in all the battles in which they chose to engage. Even though they were at the cutting edge of analytic innovation, they still faced formidable opposition. The legislative achievement represented by the Employment Act of 1946 has sometimes been treated as a triumph for a Keynesian point of view.
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- Information
- Designs within DisorderFranklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945, pp. 169 - 171Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996