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II - Ordinary Reason Applied to Law: Natural Reasoning and Deduction from Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Larry Alexander  and
Emily Sherwin
Larry Alexander
Affiliation:
University of San Diego School of Law
Emily Sherwin
Affiliation:
Cornell University Law School, New York
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Summary

In our view, there are two plausible models of common-law reasoning, and only two. The first is the “natural” model, in which courts resolve disputes by deciding what outcome is best, all things considered. In the courts' balance of reasons for decision, prior judicial decisions are entitled to exactly the weight they naturally command. The second model of common-law reasoning is the “rule” model, in which courts treat rules announced by prior courts as serious rules of decision, but then revert to natural decision making when rules provide no answers.

The difference between these two models of common-law reasoning is that the natural model treats judicial decisions as facts about the world, whereas the rule model treats them as sources of law. In the next chapter, we explain why, contrary to many popular views of common-law decision making, we believe that there are no other intelligible ways to reason from precedent.

The Natural Model of Common-Law Reasoning

The most obvious tools for courts to use in addressing controversies are moral and empirical reasoning. We assume that moral reasoning follows the Rawlsian method of wide reflective equilibrium: the reasoner makes an initial judgment about how a particular case should be resolved, formulates a tentative moral principle to support his or her initial judgment, and then tests the principle by picturing other actual and hypothetical examples of its application. If the principle yields results the reasoner judges to be wrong in test cases, the reasoner must refine the analysis.

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Demystifying Legal Reasoning , pp. 31 - 63
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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