Promise and Peril

doi:10.1017/9781009420815.008

5 - Promise and Peril

Lessons from Shareholder Reactions to Corporate Political Activity Disclosure

from Section II - Transparency: Causes and Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 November 2023

Timothy Werner

Edited by

Thomas P. Lyon

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Thomas P. Lyon: Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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Summary

This chapter examines the role of disclosure as a tool for promoting corporate political accountability by reviewing how shareholders reacted to various events in the United States and abroad that either changed the ability of firms to engage in the political process or revealed previously hidden corporate political activity. The conclusions drawn from this summary are mixed, with investors’ reactions contingent on myriad factors, including the form of the political activity engaged in, prior contestation over such activity by shareholders, and other firm-level nonmarket and market dynamics. The chapter concludes by discussing the limits of disclosure as a tool for regulating corporate political activity, as well as public policy more broadly, and advocates for broader, institutional reforms regarding the role of money in politics.

Keywords

disclosure lobbying campaign finance Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission independent expenditures dark money American Legislative Exchange Council Republican Governors Association event study investor reaction shareholder resolutions corporate governance regulation employee ideology

Type: Chapter
Information: Corporate Political Responsibility , pp. 124 - 154

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009420815.008 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2023

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5 - Promise and Peril

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