Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Map of Indonesia
- Glossary
- 1 A Distinctive Path
- 2 Democratization Before Renovation
- 3 Creeping Reform
- 4 A Game of Inches
- 5 Anomalies, Ironies, Regularities, and Surprises
- 6 The Shape of the New System
- 7 Low-Quality Democracy and Its Discontents
- 8 Causes, Consequences, and the Consequences of the Consequences
- Index
- References
8 - Causes, Consequences, and the Consequences of the Consequences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Map of Indonesia
- Glossary
- 1 A Distinctive Path
- 2 Democratization Before Renovation
- 3 Creeping Reform
- 4 A Game of Inches
- 5 Anomalies, Ironies, Regularities, and Surprises
- 6 The Shape of the New System
- 7 Low-Quality Democracy and Its Discontents
- 8 Causes, Consequences, and the Consequences of the Consequences
- Index
- References
Summary
There is no single correct path to constitutional democracy, and there is no single set of institutional choices that is best for constitutional democracy in the face of major social divisions. On both counts, finding the best course begins with an assessment of where the society and polity have been historically and where they stand at the time of transition. Admittedly, this is a vague formulation, but the Indonesian case helps identify the relevant variables.
Those who advocate extensive public participation in constitution making and/or creation of separate, independent bodies for constitutional drafting are propounding a prescription that is surely right for many countries but would not have been right for Indonesia. Against the received history of deadlock in the Konstituante, which paved the way for dictatorship, and against the possibility of a secular-nationalist and military veto of dramatic, one-shot constitutional reform, Indonesia’s course of gradual, intramural reform was a reasonable choice.
Similarly, those who advocate either proportional representation or plurality or majority-runoff elections as the universally valid electoral choice will have to rest easy in the knowledge that those systems provide different sets of costs and benefits in various contexts, and they will have to contend with Indonesia’s demonstration that, in combination, both systems can produce a useful institutional mix for governing a society with a particular cleavage structure. The same goes for other uniform strictures, such as those against presidentialism, an institution that functions in Indonesia to create cross-cleavage alliances. A configuration of institutions that reinforces multipolar fluidity and intergroup alliances against the danger of bifurcation must be accounted a success.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia , pp. 261 - 296Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013
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