Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Map of Indonesia
- Glossary
- 1 A Distinctive Path
- 2 Democratization Before Renovation
- 3 Creeping Reform
- 4 A Game of Inches
- 5 Anomalies, Ironies, Regularities, and Surprises
- 6 The Shape of the New System
- 7 Low-Quality Democracy and Its Discontents
- 8 Causes, Consequences, and the Consequences of the Consequences
- Index
- References
5 - Anomalies, Ironies, Regularities, and Surprises
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Map of Indonesia
- Glossary
- 1 A Distinctive Path
- 2 Democratization Before Renovation
- 3 Creeping Reform
- 4 A Game of Inches
- 5 Anomalies, Ironies, Regularities, and Surprises
- 6 The Shape of the New System
- 7 Low-Quality Democracy and Its Discontents
- 8 Causes, Consequences, and the Consequences of the Consequences
- Index
- References
Summary
As the new regime began operations in earnest, it became possible to view the first consequences of the decisions that had been taken. Regional autonomy took hold quickly. In many regions, there was great enthusiasm to exercise the new powers, in some cases to go beyond what was granted, and in some subregions to obtain full regional status. It was also possible to identify some design anomalies in the devolution scheme that derived from apprehensions about the consequences of decentralization for a united Indonesia. With the national elections of 2004, the new party system underwent some changes, not particularly in the direction of the drafters’ intentions. There was somewhat greater fragmentation of the party system, and direct election of the president helped to reduce voters’ party loyalties and increase the overall fluidity of the system. The presidential electoral system did not, in one respect, work as intended, but it did produce broad national appeals and strong, mixed tickets – so strong, in fact, that the vice president’s power could be greater than anyone had envisioned it might be. Institutional design, the first results confirmed, is a soft science.
THE DEVOLUTION REVOLUTION
The radical devolution that had been enacted before the 1999 DPR election and was later constitutionalized produced great ambivalence in the MPR about the powers of the second house. It was agreed early on that there would be a house to represent the regions. By 2000, its main contours were also envisioned across party lines. There would be equal representation of each province and a house much smaller than the DPR. The DPD would be elected, but perhaps by a nonpartisan process, and its powers would be strictly limited. A weak DPD was a non-negotiable condition for PDI-P, which, with its civilian and armed forces allies, was easily able to block amendments.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia , pp. 124 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013