Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- 116. Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527)
- 117. Maimonides, Moses (1138–1204)
- 118. Marxist Readings
- 119. Mathematics
- 120. Memory
- 121. Metaphysical Thoughts
- 122. Meyer, Lodewijk (1629–1681)
- 123. Mind
- 124. Mind–Body Identity
- 125. Miracles
- 126. Modality
- 127. Mode
- 128. Model of Human Nature
- 129. Monarchy
- 130. Moses
- 131. Multitude
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
126. - Modality
from M
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- 116. Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527)
- 117. Maimonides, Moses (1138–1204)
- 118. Marxist Readings
- 119. Mathematics
- 120. Memory
- 121. Metaphysical Thoughts
- 122. Meyer, Lodewijk (1629–1681)
- 123. Mind
- 124. Mind–Body Identity
- 125. Miracles
- 126. Modality
- 127. Mode
- 128. Model of Human Nature
- 129. Monarchy
- 130. Moses
- 131. Multitude
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
The necessity (necessitas) of all things is one of the most distinctive features of Spinoza’s philosophy. For those opposed to Spinoza it is, along with the treatment of God, its most notorious feature. In the Ethics, it is proclaimed and explained in various places. One main point is that God, the only substance, exists necessarily (E1p7d, E1p11). A second main point is that nothing exists apart from God and what is is conceived through God (E1p14–15), but what is conceived through God “follows [sequi]” from God: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect)” (E1p16). In this passage, the scope of the “everything” characterizing what falls under the infinite intellect seems to be everything without qualification, leaving no room for anything to not follow from God. Moreover, God is the cause of everything (E1p16c1), and E1a3 tells us, “From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow” (emphasis added).
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- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 363 - 368Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024