Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- 66. Faith
- 67. Falsity and Error
- 68. Feeling
- 69. Fiction
- 70. Follow
- 71. Form
- 72. Fortitude
- 73. Fortune
- 74. Freedom (Metaphysical)
- 75. Freedom (Political)
- 76. Friendship
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
75. - Freedom (Political)
from F
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- 66. Faith
- 67. Falsity and Error
- 68. Feeling
- 69. Fiction
- 70. Follow
- 71. Form
- 72. Fortitude
- 73. Fortune
- 74. Freedom (Metaphysical)
- 75. Freedom (Political)
- 76. Friendship
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
Freedom (libertas) and unfreedom (servitudo) are unquestionably central moral concepts for Spinoza. This is reflected in the titles to the last two parts of the Ethics, “Of Human Bondage” and “Of the Power of the Intellect, or On Human Freedom,” respectively. As a moral concept, freedom consists in the power to exist and act from one’s nature alone, which is a matter of gaining rational control over one’s affects, coming to know oneself and God, and experiencing the kind of love and contentment of mind (acquiescentia animi) that arises from such knowledge. Henceforth, I will refer to this sense of freedom as ‘moral’ freedom.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 191 - 194Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024