47. - Desire

Summary

The concept of desire (cupiditas) is central to Spinoza’s theory of motivation. It is that affect by which one is determined to think or act in some particular way (E3p56; E3DA1). It is also, along with joy and sadness, one of the three primary affects (E3p11s). But despite its significance, there is much about Spinoza’s account of desire that remains subject to debate. Interpretative questions include: what exactly is the relationship between striving and desire? How are we to reconcile the three apparently different construals that Spinoza gives of desire? If affects are changes in one’s power of acting, in what sense is desire an affect at all? How are we to understand relationships between desire, joy, and sadness such that they can all be “primary” affects? And how should we understand the meaning and scope of Spinoza’s bold assertion that we do not desire things because we judge them to be good, but rather judge things to be good because we desire them (E3p9s)? This entry considers answers to each of these questions.