Book contents
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume III
- General Introduction
- Introduction
- Part I The Late Vietnam War
- 1 Nixon’s War
- 2 US Military Strategy in the Nixon Era
- 3 The US Congress and the Vietnam War
- 4 US Antiwar Sentiment and International Relationships in the Late Vietnam War
- 5 Saigon War Politics, 1968–1975
- 6 Hanoi’s Politburo at War, 1969–1975
- 7 The Vietnam War and the Regional Context
- 8 Moscow, Beijing, and Détente
- 9 The Easter Offensive and the Second Air War
- 10 The Second Civil War, 1973–1975
- 11 Cambodia at War
- 12 Laos at War
- Part II The Postwar Era
- Part III Legacies
- Index
10 - The Second Civil War, 1973–1975
from Part I - The Late Vietnam War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume III
- General Introduction
- Introduction
- Part I The Late Vietnam War
- 1 Nixon’s War
- 2 US Military Strategy in the Nixon Era
- 3 The US Congress and the Vietnam War
- 4 US Antiwar Sentiment and International Relationships in the Late Vietnam War
- 5 Saigon War Politics, 1968–1975
- 6 Hanoi’s Politburo at War, 1969–1975
- 7 The Vietnam War and the Regional Context
- 8 Moscow, Beijing, and Détente
- 9 The Easter Offensive and the Second Air War
- 10 The Second Civil War, 1973–1975
- 11 Cambodia at War
- 12 Laos at War
- Part II The Postwar Era
- Part III Legacies
- Index
Summary
The 1973–75 period has received scant attention from western scholars. For most, the war ended when the Americans left, but the seeds of the destruction of South Vietnam were sown with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973. Although both Vietnamese antagonists had suffered tremendous physical damage during the 1972 offensive, their irreconcilable political visions prevented them from creating peace. Hanoi had refused to remove its troops from the country after the offensive, and, despite a signed agreement, it had promptly broken the accords, determined to conquer Saigon and unite the country under its flag. Thus, there are four main reasons for the defeat of South Vietnam: North Vietnamese abrogation of the Paris Peace Accords, dire South Vietnamese economic conditions, the reduction of US aid and its debilitating effect on the South Vietnamese military, and President Nguyen Van Thieu’s strategic military blunders. The first three forced Thieu into an impossible predicament, which led to the fourth. The outcome was the fall of South Vietnam.
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- The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War , pp. 233 - 253Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024