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9 - The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism

from Part I - Historical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2020

By
Richard Arneson
Edited by
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti ,
Siddiqur Osmani  and
Mozaffar Qizilbash
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti
Affiliation:
University of Pavia
Siddiqur Osmani
Affiliation:
Ulster University
Mozaffar Qizilbash
Affiliation:
University of York
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Summary

Prominent theories of justice conjoin the capabilities approach and a doctrine of ‘political liberalism’. The latter maintains that the exercise of state power is morally legitimate only if it is justifiable by appeal to principles that all reasonable citizens can accept, each from her own evaluative perspective. As standardly interpreted, political liberalism rules out selecting state policies on perfectionist grounds. The political perfectionist holds that it is morally mandatory for the state to promote certain activities and conditions on the ground that they are intrinsically valuable. The claim then is that reasonable citizens will differ widely in their beliefs about these intrinsic value matters, so a state that chooses its policies by appeal to perfectionist judgements will be morally illegitimate. This chapter canvasses recent debate on this issue, and suggests that the marriage of the capabilities approach and political liberalism is ill-advised. Political liberalism should be dropped, whether or not one adheres to the capabilities approach. A modest, common-sense perfectionism cohabits harmoniously with the capabilities approach.

Keywords

perfectionismpolitical liberalismcapabilities approachobjective list account of individual well-beingopportunity for well-beingpaternalism
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach , pp. 165 - 187
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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