Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 The Perennial and Dynamic Relationship between Human Rights and Natural Law
- Part I Natural Law and the Origins of Human Rights
- Part II Natural Law Foundations of Human Rights Obligations
- Part III Natural Law and Human Rights within Religious Traditions
- Part IV The Human Person, Political Community, and Rule of Law
- Part V Rival Interpretations and Interpretive Principles
- Part VI Challenges and Future Prospects
- Index
1 - The Perennial and Dynamic Relationship between Human Rights and Natural Law
from Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2022
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 The Perennial and Dynamic Relationship between Human Rights and Natural Law
- Part I Natural Law and the Origins of Human Rights
- Part II Natural Law Foundations of Human Rights Obligations
- Part III Natural Law and Human Rights within Religious Traditions
- Part IV The Human Person, Political Community, and Rule of Law
- Part V Rival Interpretations and Interpretive Principles
- Part VI Challenges and Future Prospects
- Index
Summary
This introductory chapter identifies the key questions, themes and debates addressed within the Handbook on Natural Law and Human Rights, and provides a conceptual overview of and integrated perspective on its contents. In particular, it argues that there is a perennial relationship between human rights and the phenomenon of natural law, which is revealed when we consider how human rights claims can justify the moral demands made on other agents and on the political community. Without prior moral duties – a natural law – human rights claims are impugned by the ‘individualist fallacy’, whereby the potential value of the right to the claimant is presumed sufficient to impose overriding duties, without due consideration being paid to the constitutive social commitments necessary to make that value a matter of common concern and action. The failure to come to grips with this problem, we argue, has led to certain blindspots in contemporary human rights theory and practice. This chapter draws to a close by identifying the key benefits we see accruing from a natural law theory of human rights.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022