Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-669899f699-vbsjw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-03T06:02:00.921Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Moral Motivation

from Part I - Building Blocks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2025

By
William Ratoff  and
Adina L. Roskies
Edited by
Bertram Malle  and
Philip Robbins
Bertram Malle
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
Philip Robbins
Affiliation:
University of Missouri
Get access

Summary

This chapter of the handbook tackles the question of how first-person moral judgments and moral behavior are conceptually linked. The authors frame their discussion in terms of a philosophical puzzle known as “Hume’s Problem.” The puzzle arises from the conjunction of three ideas: Humeanism, the idea that beliefs alone do not suffice to motivate action; internalism, the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating; and cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are beliefs. These three ideas are jointly inconsistent, so at least one of them must be false. But which one? The authors focus their attention on two possible solutions to the puzzle: the externalist solution, which denies that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating (rescinding internalism); and the noncognitivist solution, which denies that moral judgments are beliefs (rescinding cognitivism). Based on the psychological and neuropsychological evidence bearing on these proposals, however, it appears that neither of these solutions to Hume’s Problem has solid empirical support.

Keywords

moral motivationmoral judgmentmoral behaviorinternalismcognitivismHumeanism
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology , pp. 55 - 77
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Adler, J. (2002). Belief’s own ethics. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aharoni, E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A new look at the moral/conventional distinction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121(2), 484–497.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aharoni, E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Kiehl, K. A. (2014). What’s wrong? Moral understanding in psychopathic offenders. Journal of Research in Personality, 53, 175–181.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Anscombe, G. E. (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Ayer, A. (1936). Language, truth, and logic. Ryerson Press.Google Scholar
Barger, B., & Derryberry, W. P. (2013). Do negative mood states impact moral reasoning? Journal of Moral Education, 42(4), 443–459.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berthoz, S., Artiges, E., Van De Moortele, P.-F., Poline, J.-B., Rouquette, S., Consoli, S. M., & Martinot, J.-L. (2002). Effect of impaired recognition and expression of emotions on frontocingulate cortices: An fMRI study of men with alexithymia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 159(6), 961–967.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Björnsson, G., Eriksson, J., Strandberg, C., Olidner, R., & Björklund, F. (2015). Motivational internalism and folk intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 28(5), 715–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling passions: A theory of practical reasoning. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blair, R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the psychopath. Cognition, 57, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Blair, R. (1997). Moral reasoning and the child with psychopathic tendencies. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 731–739.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In Sayre-McCord, G. (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 181–228). Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Bratman, M. (1987). Intentions, plans, and practical reason. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Brink, D. (1997). Moral motivation. Ethics, 108(1), 4–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cholbi, M. (2006). Belief attribution and the falsification of motive internalism. Philosophical Psychology, 19(5), 607–616.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Copp, D. (2018). Realist-expressivism and the fundamental role of normative belief. Philosophical Studies, 175(6), 1333–1356.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cusimano, C., Thapa, S., & Malle, B. F. (2017). Judgment before emotion: People access moral evaluations faster than affective states. In Gunzelmann, G., Howes, A., Tenbrink, T., & Davelaar, E. J. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1848–1853). Cognitive Science Society.Google Scholar
Damasio, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1990). Individuals with sociopathic behavior caused by frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social stimuli. Behavioral Brain Research, 41, 91–94.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Darwall, S. (1983). Impartial reason. Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Dreier, J. (2015). Another world. In Smith, R. N. & Johnson, M. (Eds.), Passions and projections: Themes from the philosophy of Simon Blackburn (pp. 155–171). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gamez-Djokic, M., & Molden, D. (2016). Beyond affective influences on deontological moral judgment: The role of motivations for prevention in the moral condemnation of harm. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(11), 1522–1537.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gawronski, B., Conway, P., Armstrong, J., Friesdorf, R., & Hütter, M. (2018). Effects of incidental emotions on moral dilemma judgments: An analysis using the CNI model. Emotion, 18(7), 989–1008.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings: A theory of normative judgment. Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gray, K., & Schein, C. (2016). No absolutism here: Harm predicts moral judgment 30× better than disgust–commentary on Scott, Inbar, & Rozin (2016). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(3), 325–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greene, J. D., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517–523.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L., Engell, A., Darley, J., & Cohen, J. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 389–400.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), Article 5537.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haidt, J., Björklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason [Unpublished manuscript. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d415/e7fa2c2df922dac194441516a509ba5eb7ec.pdf]. University of Virginia.Google Scholar
Heekeren, H. R., Wartenburger, I., Schmidt, H., Schwintowski, H.-P., & Villringer, A. (2003). An fMRI study of simple ethical decision-making. NeuroReport, 14(9), 1215–1219.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hieronymi, P. (2005). The wrong kind of reason. Journal of Philosophy, 102(9), 437–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holton, R. (2009). Willing, wanting, waiting. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, R. (2008). What neuroscience can (and cannot) contribute to metaethics. In Sinnot-Armstrong, W. (Ed.), Moral psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 371–394). MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral-conventional distinction. Mind & Language, 22, 117–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korsgaard, C. M. (1986). Skepticism about practical reason. Journal of Philosophy, 83(1), 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Does incidental disgust amplify moral judgment? A meta-analytic review of experimental evidence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(4), 518–536.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Leary, S. (2017a). In defense of practical reasons for belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3), 529–542.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leary, S. (2017b). Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths. Philosophical Psychology, 30(7), 878–895.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1988). Desire as belief. Mind, 97, 323–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1996). Desire as belief II. Mind, 105, 303–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Marusic, B., & Schwenkler, J. (2018). Intending is believing: A defense of strong cognitivism. Analytic Philosophy, 59(3), 309–340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNaughton, D. (1988). Moral vision: An introduction to ethics. Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Bramati, I. E., & Grafman, J. (2002). Functional networks in emotional moral and nonmoral social judgments. Neuroimage, 16(3, Part A), 696–703.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nagel, T. (1970). The possibility of altruism. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Nichols, S. (2002). How psychopaths threaten moral rationalism: Is it irrational to be amoral? The Monist, 85(2), 285–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S. (2004). Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nucci, L. P. (2001). Education in the moral domain. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Phan, K., Wager, T., Taylor, S., & Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. NeuroImage, 16(2), 331–348.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Platts, M. (1991). Moral realities: An essay in philosophical psychology. Routledge.Google Scholar
Prinz, J. (2007). The emotional construction of morals. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prinz, J. (2015). An empirical case for motivational internalism. In Strandberg, C., Björklund, F., Björnsson, G., Eriksson, J., & Olinder, R. F. (Eds.), Motivational internalism (pp. 61–84). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of “meaning.” In Putnam, H., Philosophical papers (pp. 215–271). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Railton, P. (1986). Moral realism. Philosophical Review, 95(2), 163–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roskies, A. (2003). Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from ‘acquired sociopathy.’ Philosophical Psychology, 16(1), 51–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ross, J. (2009). How to be a cognitivist about practical reason. Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, 4, 243–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Royzman, E. B., Kim, K., & Leeman, R. F. (2015). The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4), 296–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 300(5626), 1755–1758.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Saver, J., & Damasio, A. (1991). Preserved access and processing of social knowledge in a patient with acquired sociopathy due to ventromedial frontal damage. Neuropsychologia, 29, 1241–1249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. (2013). Being realistic about reasons. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096–1109.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schroeder, M. (2007). Slaves of the passions. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeder, T. (2004). Three faces of desire. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeder, T., Roskies, A., & Nichols, S. (2010). Moral motivation. In Doris, J. and The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The moral psychology handbook (pp. 72–110). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schueler, G. F. (2009). The Humean theory of motivation rejected. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78, 103–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Setiya, K. (2008). Practical knowledge. Ethics, 118(3), 388–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral realism: A defense. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shah, N. (2006). A new argument for evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(225), 481–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinhababu, N. (2009). The Humean theory of motivation reformulated and defended. Philosophical Review, 118, 465–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smetana, J. G. (1981). Preschool children’s conceptions of moral and social rules. Child Development, 52, 1333–1336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. (1987). The Humean theory of motivation. Mind, 96, 36–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Smith, M. (2007). The truth about internalism. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (Ed.), Moral psychology: Vol. 3. The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development (pp. 207–215). MIT Press.Google Scholar
Solomon, R. C. (1976). The passions: The myth and nature of human emotion. Anchor.Google Scholar
Stahl, T., Zaal, M. P., & Skitka, L. J. (2016). Moralized rationality: Relying on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of belief can be seen as a moral issue. PLoS ONE, 11(11), Article e0166332.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Strandberg, C., & Björklund, F. (2013). Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions? Philosophical Psychology, 26(3), 319–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
van Roojen, M. (2018). Moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2018 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-cognitivism.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. D. (1989). Practical reflection. Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Wallace, R. J. (2006). Moral motivation. In Dreier, J. (Ed.), Contemporary debates in moral theory (pp. 182–195). Blackwell.Google Scholar
Way, J. (2016). Two arguments for evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 805–818.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedgwood, R. (2007). The nature of normativity. Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe. Psychological Science, 16(10), 780–784.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×