Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 An Institutional Theory of Miscalculation
- 3 The World of National Security Institutions
- 4 China under Mao
- 5 China after Mao
- 6 India
- 7 Pakistan
- 8 The United States during the Early Cold War
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A National Security Institutions Data Set
- Appendix B Archival and Interview Data Collection
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International Relations
7 - Pakistan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 An Institutional Theory of Miscalculation
- 3 The World of National Security Institutions
- 4 China under Mao
- 5 China after Mao
- 6 India
- 7 Pakistan
- 8 The United States during the Early Cold War
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A National Security Institutions Data Set
- Appendix B Archival and Interview Data Collection
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Summary
This chapter extends the analysis in Chapter 6 by examining the origins and consequences of national security institutions in Pakistan from 1947 to 2015. Unlike India, the persistent threat of bureaucratic punishment prevented the emergence of integrated institutions, despite the salient international threats faced by its political leaders. Instead, Pakistan has cycled between siloed and fragmented institutions, with civilian leaders tending to adopt the former and military rulers tending to choose the latter. The chapter argues that the reason for this pattern stems from differences in political agenda. Military leaders have historically pursued ambitious programs to transform Pakistan’s society and economy, which would allow the military to return to the barracks. A medium-n analysis of Pakistan’s institutional performance suggests that siloed and fragmented institutions tended to perform poorly relative to India’s integrated institutions. Process tracing of the 1999 Kargil War illustrates that this poor performance can be attributed to low-quality bureaucratic information upon which Pakistan’s leaders based their choice for conflict.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Bureaucracies at WarThe Institutional Origins of Miscalculation, pp. 226 - 258Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024