5 - China after Mao

Summary

This chapter extends the analysis of the origins and consequences of China’s national security institutions into the post-Mao era. It first discusses the political reasons why fragmented institutions persisted after Mao’s death and why Chinese leaders subsequently opted for siloed, rather than integrated, institutions. It then presents a medium-n analysis exploring the differences in crisis performance between fragmented and siloed institutions. The decision-making processes leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 2001 EP-3 Crisis demonstrate the distinct pathways by which fragmented and siloed institutions cause leaders to miscalculate. Whereas Chinese leaders received incomplete information prior to the Sino-Vietnamese War because bureaucrats feared speaking truth to power, Chinese leaders received inaccurate information prior to the onset of the 2001 EP-3 Crisis because bureaucrats were dissuaded from contesting one another’s reporting. Both cases advance the book’s argument regarding the importance of information quality as opposed to political accountability.