Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contenst
- Dedication
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Glossary
- Map
- Introduction
- 1 The balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest
- 2 Britain, Hanover and the protestant interest prior to the Hanoverian succession
- 3 The Palatinate crisis and its aftermath, 1719–1724
- 4 The Thorn crisis and European diplomacy, 1724–1727
- 5 George II and challenges to the protestant interest
- 6 Walpole, the War of the Polish succession, and ‘national interest’
- 7 The decline of the protestant interest?
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contenst
- Dedication
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Glossary
- Map
- Introduction
- 1 The balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest
- 2 Britain, Hanover and the protestant interest prior to the Hanoverian succession
- 3 The Palatinate crisis and its aftermath, 1719–1724
- 4 The Thorn crisis and European diplomacy, 1724–1727
- 5 George II and challenges to the protestant interest
- 6 Walpole, the War of the Polish succession, and ‘national interest’
- 7 The decline of the protestant interest?
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Foreign policy in Britain and Hanover in the eighteenth century was based on ideas, not just immediate interests. Reconstructing the history of diplomatic thought throws valuable light on how Britons and Hanoverians thought about themselves and their rulers. It is common to regard the eighteenth century as characterised by the ‘enlightened’ diplomacy of the balance of power. Yet it is important to remember that the balance of power could mean different things to different people at different times. This does not render it meaningless. Rather, the historian must locate the specific meanings of the term. For the early eighteenth century, this study has illustrated how the balance of power was associated in the minds of diplomats, statesmen and their subjects in Britain and Hanover with the need to combat the threat of universal monarchy posed by ‘papist’ states. Hence it was important to remember what the balance of power was designed to replace, as well as what it was supposed to achieve. Although it was still occasionally possible to find instances of the drive towards universal monarchy being blamed on the malign forces of the pope, as George I did at times during the Palatinate crisis, more often than not, Austria, France or Spain were perceived to pose the greatest threat to the balance of power, due to their respective desires for universal monarchy. The maintenance of the balance of power went hand in hand with the need to defend the protestant interest.
Assessments of which power posed the greatest threat to the protestant interest varied over time. Under William III the threat was clearly identified with Louis XIV's France. While the Stuarts represented the twin evils of popery and arbitrary government at home, France stood for the fears of popery and universal monarchy abroad. Williamite policy in the 1690s sought to combat both. Thus the legacy that William was to bequeath to his Hanoverian successors was one of continental involvement, a policy which was to become the dominant strand within court whig foreign policy thinking. The proscription of the tories after 1715 and the consolidation of the whig oligarchy meant that ‘official’ British foreign policy was strongly European in orientation until George II's death. Ministry and monarch agreed about the importance of both Europe and protestantism for much of the period.
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- Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756 , pp. 229 - 237Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2006