Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Alvin Plantinga, God's Philosopher
- 1 Natural Theology
- 2 Evil and Alvin Plantinga
- 3 The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga
- 4 Natural Theology and Naturalist Atheology: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
- 5 Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat
- 6 Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief
- 7 Pluralism and Proper Function
- 8 Plantinga's Replacement Argument
- Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments
- Select Bibliography
- Index
4 - Natural Theology and Naturalist Atheology: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Alvin Plantinga, God's Philosopher
- 1 Natural Theology
- 2 Evil and Alvin Plantinga
- 3 The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga
- 4 Natural Theology and Naturalist Atheology: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
- 5 Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat
- 6 Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief
- 7 Pluralism and Proper Function
- 8 Plantinga's Replacement Argument
- Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Natural theology has always had to contend with the argument from evil. The evil around us seemingly supports a deductive argument for the conclusion that there is no God of the sort affirmed by theology. More recently, natural theology has faced new problems, or old problems with a new urgency. Darwin, for example, showed how evolutionary design rivals Divine design, endangering the important Argument from Design. Suppose certain phenomena admit two rival, independent explanations. Any such explanation no better than its rival is insufficiently supported thereby. Theology had proposed Divine design as an explanation of the order around us. Evolutionary theory offers now a rival explanation that purports to be at least as good while independent of Divine agency.
Both of these attacks are “direct.” They both confront theology directly on its own ground, by countering its theses in one of two ways. One way is by direct refutation of a theological proposition: The evil we see leaves no rational room for an omnipotent, fully benevolent God. The other way attacks, rather, the cogency of theology's rational support: by arguing, for example, that Divine agency is no longer needed to explain the order of things.
Although both of these attacks are direct, the first is more direct, since it clashes frontally with the theological proposition that there is a God. From the premise that there is evil, it concludes that there is no God. The second attack is not frontal.
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- Alvin Plantinga , pp. 93 - 106Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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