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Family Taxation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2025

Patricia Apps
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
Ray Rees
Affiliation:
University of Munich and CESifo

Summary

This Element seeks to provide an in-depth survey of the papers written on the optimal taxation of the incomes of the members of family households, as opposed to households with just a single individual, over the period beginning with the early 1980s and ending in the late 2010s.This literature, solidly within the public finance tradition, is not large, and so the Element gives quite a full exposition and discussion of the main contributions. The papers are grouped according to the type of tax system they have dealt with: linear, piecewise linear and non-linear taxation.
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Online ISBN: 9781108973007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 22 May 2025

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References

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Family Taxation
  • Patricia Apps, University of Sydney, Ray Rees, University of Munich and CESifo
  • Online ISBN: 9781108973007
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Family Taxation
  • Patricia Apps, University of Sydney, Ray Rees, University of Munich and CESifo
  • Online ISBN: 9781108973007
Available formats
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Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Family Taxation
  • Patricia Apps, University of Sydney, Ray Rees, University of Munich and CESifo
  • Online ISBN: 9781108973007
Available formats
×