This chapter discusses the Ontogeny Phylogeny Model (OPM), which focuses on the formation and development of second language phonological systems. It proposes an interrelationship between L2 native-like productions, L1 transfer, and universal factors. The model argues that chronologically, and as style becomes increasingly formal, L2 native-like processes increase, L1 transfer processes decrease, and universal processes increase and then decrease. It further claims that the roles of universals and L1 transfer are mediated by markedness and similarity, both of which slow L2 acquisition. Specifically, in similar phenomena L1 transfer processes persist, while in marked phenomena universal processes persist. The OPM also argues that these same principles obtain for learners acquiring more than one L2, monolingual and bilingual acquisition, and L1 attrition. In addition to the chronological stages and variation of the individual learner, the model claims that these relationships hold true for language variation and change, including pidgins and creoles.

Péter Lautner’s chapter ‘Concepts in the Neoplatonist Tradition’ expands the scope of the enquiry by discussing Platonist theories of concept formation in Late Antiquity. Generally speaking, the philosophers belonging to the so-called schools of Athens and Alexandria believe that the articulation of our rational capacity and the acquisition of knowledge somehow derives from the senses as well as the intellect, and they mostly agree that some elements of concept formation, notably generalisation, occur on the basis of sense-perception. They disagree, however, as to whether or not such generalisations are full-blown concepts. While all the philosophers under consideration endorse some version of the view that the main source of concepts is our intellect, which essentially contains fully fledged concepts, their accounts vary in respect of the intellect’s ability to project concepts onto the lower cognitive faculties. The problem of how the two kinds of concepts mentioned above are related to each other occupies the Platonists through the entire period under examination and constitutes the focus of Lautner’s analysis.

Engaging directly with the question whether Platonic Forms are concepts, David Sedley’s chapter ’Are Platonic Forms Concepts?’ takes its start from the Parmenides 132b–c, where Socrates and Parmenides briefly examine the hypothesis that Forms are ‘thoughts’ (noēmata). Sedley asks what ‘thoughts’ are in that context, and argues that they are not thought contents, but acts of thinking. The chapter offers an ambitious and comprehensive analysis of the classical theory of Forms as showcased in the Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides, and Timaeus, in terms that clarify why Plato was bound to reject the hypothesis considered in the Parmenides (132b–c), namely that Forms are thoughts.

‘Concepts and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysical Thought’ by Christof Rapp starts with the recognition that Aristotle does not have a general term for ‘concept’ and examines which entities in his metaphysical theory might play the role of concepts. According to Rapp, many of Aristotle’s discussions focus on the meaning of general terms and whether they signify something real and existing independently in its own right. Aristotle remains committed to the view that universals as captured by genuine definitions are crucial for human knowledge and understanding. Insofar as Aristotle resists a conception of universals as existing in the way that particular substances do, he can be taken to intimate that universals are ‘merely conceptual’. In the Metaphysics, he distances himself from the view that universals such as genera and species qualify as substances. His main contribution to our thinking about concepts consists in the view that both universals and embodied substantial forms have mental counterparts, by which we grasp and understand the things falling under the conceived form or essential definition.

Plotinus’ views on concepts have so far received little attention, whereas his views on ennoiai, conceptions, have been more widely discussed. This is partly due to the varied vocabulary that Plotinus uses to refer to what we might call concepts, assuming that the latter are understood as mental items distinct from thoughts. Sara Magrin’s chapter ‘Plotinus on Concepts’ focuses on one important passage of the Enneads (Ennead 6.6.12–14) which offers a critical discussion of an account of the concepts (ennoēmata) of one and numbers commonly attributed to the Stoics. The chapter pursues the twofold aim of reconstructing the account in question and of interpreting and assessing Plotinus’ criticism of it. This has scarcely, if ever, been attempted in the scholarship, both because the evidential value of that passage in respect of the Stoics has been deemed questionable and because Plotinus’ criticism of the Stoic concept of number is extremely compact and difficult to articulate. The main contribution of Magrin’s analysis consists in her use of Plotinus’ criticism of the Stoics as evidence, on the basis of which she pieces together Plotinus’ views on concepts.

‘Early Christian Philosophers on Concepts’ by George Karamanolis integrates some of the themes encountered in previous chapters into the broad theological perspective of the early Christian thinkers, according to which explorations in every area of philosophy are ultimately intended to reveal aspects of God’s relation to His creation. It is argued that the position of the early Christian philosophers on concepts is part of their perceptual realism and their stance against scepticism. Karamanolis examines three case studies: the theories of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa. In all three cases, he maintains, concepts are treated both as mental representations and semantic/linguistic items through which we grasp reality. Clement develops his view on concepts in the context of an anti-sceptical elaboration of his thesis that knowledge of the world is propositional and attainable by humans, while Origen and Gregory of Nyssa defend more sophisticated theories of concepts in connection with their respective epistemologies. In every case a theological question motivates the Christian author’s stance with regard to the nature and formation of concepts.

This chapter aims to unravel the contribution of the neuroscience of reading to the study of literacy development across languages and writing systems. The development of early literacy can be adversely impacted by neurodevelopmental disorders and socioeconomic disparities that have lasting effects on child and adolescent cognition. The goal of this chapter is to address the continuum of literacy development in two critical stages, birth-to-six and six-to-ten years old, and their respective language and brain milestones: the hardwired brain networks for speech, and the adaptation of brain regions for reading. The discussion attempts to disambiguate neurodevelopmental disorders and socioeconomic factors that influence early literacy, and the associated effects on brain function and structure. It is concluded that there is emerging evidence for a near-universal brain system that develops with learning to read across writing systems and the chapter addresses the dynamic relations among brain networks for reading, speech and writing across the two age spans. It is also claimed that the neuroscience of reading has the potential to inform prediction of reading achievement, identification of risk for reading difficulties, and possibly, choice of intervention and of the age ranges that are more amenable to treatment.

This chapter deals with global literacy development in relation to writing systems. A global perspective on literacy compels attention to global variation in languages and writing systems. The history of writing involves processes of discovery, borrowing, and modification, which language communities go through when they move toward a literate society. These processes require choices to be made regarding the graphic forms and how they connect to the spoken language and to broader cultural and educational considerations, including how new generations can learn this writing to understand their language. Across the globe, writing systems have developed varying solutions as to how to represent their spoken language, that is, its phonological, morphological, and semantic properties. In this chapter, some of the solutions to this mapping problem through invention and variation will be examined , and cognitive principles aiding the process of learning to read across languages and writing systems are proposed. The chapter concludes that writing systems follow the same set of operating principles in learning to read but that the they differences between them do matter for in terms of understanding the weighting of reading procedures and different educational challenges. It is also emphasized that all writing systems are learnable, and instruction effectively geared toward their specific properties may be successful for most children.

In this introductory chapter, we examine the worldwide distribution of literacy, its development with schooling, and the sources of individual variation in literacy outcomes. Various perspectives on global variation are discussed while also aiming for a common framework to describe literacy development that recognizes demographic boundaries in the world, on the one hand, and its global variation as a function of bio-ecological markers on the other hand. In this introduction, we draw attention to the wealth of recent research on variations in literacy development that arise across regions and that reflect the multiple interrelated influences of individual, home, school, and societal factors. Furthermore, observations on the neurobiological and ecological markers related to global literacy are discussed. These include the role of writing systems, genetics, brain foundations, self-regulation, and sociocultural, contextual, teacher, and parental factors in global literacy development. An explanatory framework is also provided showing that literacy development involves gaining reading fluency and spelling to facilitate reading comprehension and writing, that it builds on language, and that child characteristics and home- and school-support factors combine to influence individual variation, within an indirectly influential sociopolitical context.

In this final chapter, a wide-angle perspective is provided on the major issues that arise when one thinks globally about literacy. Despite many important differences across the globe, literacy development suggests some general patterns that reflect nearly universal phases and shared operating principles. Although the “development” of literacy begins early through natural processes of language development and conceptual development, it is school experiences, explicitly designed to teach reading, that we expect to ensure the achievement of literacy. Each classroom within a school is its own literacy ecosystem, with one or more teachers, students, literacy curriculum materials, assesments, and regulated interactions. The classroom itself is embedded within other systems – the school, the community, the larger school administrative units, and local, regional, and national government control agents. A Global Literacy Framework is presented, showing that literacy development is embedded in language development and can be predicted by (a) system factors, referring to variations in the linguistic and writing systems, (b) child factors, associated with the neurobiological foundation of children’s learning capacity, and (c) support factors, associated with processes in the home and at school. All these influences exist within a sociopolitical context that exerts influence broadly across the system.

What accounts for the fact that some physical events occur while others do not? This is a question of physical modality. Three models in contemporary analytic metaphysics have dominated the investigation of physical modality: the Neo-Humean Model, the Universals Model, and the Powers Model. Each model aims to explain, in ontologically conspicuous ways, the unfolding of possibilities in space and time. This chapter explains the Neo-Humean and Universals Models, then shows that while they explicitly deny a place for powers in their fundamental ontologies, they nonetheless implicate powers. That is, they subtly assume the reality of powers. As a result, the Powers Model is the way to go in explaining physical modality. However, there are different ways of conceiving powers. After describing variations of the Powers Model, the chapter returns to the main question posed in the introductory chapter: What is the nature of powers from the inside? Stricter attention to the internality of powers is necessary to better understand the Powers Model and its metaphysical commitments.

Chapter 5 discusses claims that different norms govern translation and the nature of translated text in different temporal and geographical contexts, and that translated texts differ from first-written texts. It considers the troubled relationship between the notions of norms and translation universals, and addresses the question of what constitutes a translation ‘proper’, and what characterizes the task a translator takes on when translating a piece of literature. It gives an account of the variety of approaches and attitudes taken to this task since Ancient Roman times, through to the work of Gideon Toury on translation laws and later developments that this has inspired, including work on norms, the nature of translated text, and translation universals. Translations and retranslations into English of Henrik Ibsen’s plays are used for purposes of illustration.

Chapter 4 describes the fundamental research questions, empirical approaches and findings of language typology, a linguistic subdiscipline studying language from a cross-linguistic perspective. For analysing the languages of the world comparatively in search for structural commonalities (universals) and differences (scope of variation), methodological issues include considerations on the basis of comparison, sampling, and data sources. Typological findings are finally interpreted in terms of their motivations. The chapter ends with recommendations for further reading and a list of short exercises and ideas for small research projects.

This chapter studies Lorenzo Valla’s critique of the language and thought of the scholastics. Valla contrasts classical Latin, as a natural, common language, with the so-called artificial, technical, and unnatural language of his opponents. He famously champions Quintilian’s view that one should follow common linguistic usage. Scholars, however, have disagreed about the precise interpretation of these qualifications of Latin. This chapter argues that, depending on the historical, rhetorical, and argumentative contexts, Valla uses notions such as common and natural in different ways to suit different purposes. After an examination of Valla’s notion of common linguistic usage, which is shown to refer mainly (though not always) to classical Latin, the chapter analyzes Valla’s Dialectical Disputations, which attacks metaphysical and logical concepts from Aristotelian philosophy. It is shown that Valla combines two levels of criticism: scholastic Latin is ungrammatical and it is unnatural. To make both points Valla moves between a strictly Latinate point of view, and a sociological perspective according to which use of language should follow the rules and conventions of the community. The chapter argues that this leads to a tension in Valla’s humanist project concerning Latin as a common language and the notion of the common people.

This chapter discusses the radical attack on some tenets of Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy by the sixteenth-century humanist Mario Nizolio. Focusing on his interesting but undervalued work, On the true principles and true way of philosophizing against the pseudo-philosophers (1553, edited by Leibniz in 1670), this chapter shows that his critique involves a radical de-ontologization of the conceptual armory of the scholastics, a turn toward the world of empirical things, a recognition of the central role that the human mind plays in our categorization of the world, and a plea for a clear, transparent language in doing philosophy and communication in general. Rejecting universals as essences as well as Aristotelian categories and transcendentals, Nizolio wanted to defend a horizontal ontology in which concrete things, grouped in classes by a creative act of the human mind, take center stage.Starting with Nizolio’s humanist credo, the chapter then offers an analysis of Nizolio’s criticisms of the traditional five predicables, and his account of the process of abstraction that led to the formation of these universals. After a brief discussion of proof and demonstration, and the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, the chapter ends by discussing Leibniz’s reaction to Nizolio.