This paper sets out the working party’s view that for a defined benefit pension scheme’s commutation rate the appropriate starting point should be to set it in line with the scheme’s cash equivalent transfer value basis. We recognise that there may be several reasons why an actuary in their advice may deviate from that starting point and we explore these in detail, giving our views on when deviation is and is not justified, noting that many common reasons used such as selection risk are often used without (in our view) adequate justification. We also cover frequency of review – our view is that commutation rates should be reviewed at least every 3 years and actuaries should consider performing a high-level review of commutation rates annually. We suggest that actuaries should consider proposing market-related commutation rates especially in periods of volatile market conditions. In terms of timing, there are good arguments to review commutation terms either following or during a valuation. Finally, we set out some considerations on how actuaries should present their advice, such as clearly setting out all the information required to take key decisions, following up with any actuarial certification in writing (if necessary) and illustrating the impact on members for changing commutation rates.

This article is concerned with s. 61 of the Trustee Act 1925. It will analyse the origins, design and modern day operation of the jurisdiction to relieve a trustee from personal liability following a breach of trust. It will revisit the threshold conditions of honesty, reasonableness and fairness and, in the context of mortgage fraud, contend that this exculpatory jurisdiction ought not extend to the bare commercial trust that exists between the mortgagee and its solicitor. Defects, uncertainties and shortcomings associated with s. 61 will also be addressed.

This study focuses on how voters and politicians rationally select a preferred policy-making venue (Politician or Agency), and its implications for the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians in a representative democracy. This study allows for incomplete information, as well as solving for the comparative static conditions pertaining to the extent that a politician's policy-making venue choices mirror those preferred by a representative voter. The comparative static results highlight when a politician (1) chooses the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Active or Passive Political Responsiveness); (2) is able to choose freely either policy-making venue without committing agency loss (Political Discretion); and (3) willing to deviate from the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Political Shirking). In contrast to the study by Spence, this study analytically demonstrates that one cannot infer that the benefits accrued from agency policy-making will necessarily exceed those from electoral institutions.