Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are intergovernmental meetings established by treaties to review and promote the implementation of their provisions. The literature on COPs is limited and almost exclusively based on multilateral environmental agreements. The article departs from this scholarship to show that COPs are now present in different areas of international law and to discuss some of the ways in which these bodies influence the conventions that establish them. In particular, it considers how COPs affect the content and the implementation of their parent treaties. The article focuses on the bodies established by four treaties selected as case studies: the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; the Convention on Cluster Munitions; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Based on the examination of the normative decisions adopted by these organs, the article argues that COPs’ activities (i) specify and develop the content of their parent treaties by setting procedural and substantive standards that states parties must meet to comply with their obligations; and (ii) support the implementation of their parent treaties by seeking to strengthen their social and political position, facilitating the adoption of measures by states parties. COPs pursue this second goal by building momentum in favour of the implementation of their treaties, stigmatizing their adversaries, and connecting their conventions with established international legal narratives.

This article proposes a new model for the engagement of sub-state units with the international legal order. “Trialogical subsidiarity” acknowledges that some areas are best regulated locally, but it also argues that international law has an increasing say in areas traditionally reserved for local law. The implementation of an international cultural heritage treaty by constituent units (CUs) in federal states, despite objections of the federal authorities, is a case study for the possibilities and implications of the use of international law by CUs without the filtering of the central state. This use enhances the legitimacy of international law and can lead to better outcomes for local populations, moving international law closer to its promise of being a law of peoples rather than of states.

In Canada, Treaty 1 First Nations brought a claim against the Crown for land debt owed to them since 1871. In 2004, Crown land in Winnipeg became available that, according to the terms of the settlement, should have been offered for purchase to Treaty 1 Nations. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Waikato-Tainui claim arose from historical Crown breaches of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. In 1995, a settlement was reached to address the unjust Crown confiscation of Tainui lands. Despite being intended to facilitate the return of traditional territory, compensate for Crown breaches of historic treaties, and indirectly provide opportunity for economic development, in both cases, settlement was met with legal and political challenges. Using a comparative legal analysis, this paper examines how the state continues to use its law-making power to undermine socio-economic development of Indigenous communities in Canada and New Zealand, thereby thwarting opportunity for Indigenous self-determination.

Federalism presents a dilemma for the implementation of international human rights law in those African states that operate federal constitutions. Central governments in these states enjoy international legal personality, make treaties and represent their states as parties to those treaties, yet internal legislative competence over some issues regulated by treaty is commonly shared between central and regional governments. Consequently, while central governments bear responsibility for transforming international standards into national law, challenges arise in areas such as the protection of children from child marriage, where they lack exclusive national legislative competence. How have these states managed to implement international law without violating their own constitutions? Applying a comparative approach, this article argues that African federal states have employed two main models to overcome the dilemma, neither of which has been totally effective. Drawing lessons from federal states outside Africa, the article suggests other mechanisms to perfect Africa's two main models.

The newest convention of the Council of Europe requires states parties to criminalize all activities related to the trafficking in human organs. It is the first international agreement specifically aimed at addressing this form or criminal trade. Trafficking in human organs is mostly a transnational criminal enterprise: the article highlights how contracting states will have to face specific problems in prosecuting offences committed in foreign countries. The effectiveness of the convention depends on the parties’ determination in solving such problems and in avoiding taking advantage from some reservations that – though admitted by the convention – could undermine its possible value as a means of combating transnational crime.