This article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics. Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent to which different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies in the form of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing on rising powers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states such as China, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, with diasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas and great power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

Remote-access cyber espionage operations against activists, dissidents or human rights defenders abroad are increasingly a feature of digital transnational repression. This arises when State or State-related actors use digital technologies to silence or stifle dissent from human rights defenders, activists and dissidents abroad through the collection of confidential information that is then weaponized against the target or their networks. Examples include the targeting of Ghanem Al-Masarir (a Saudi dissident living in the United Kingdom), Carine Kanimba (a United States–Belgian dual citizen and daughter of Rwandan activist Paul Rusesabagina living in the United States) and Omar Abdulaziz (another Saudi dissident living in Canada) with NSO Group's mercenary spyware. This practice erodes human rights, democracy and the rule of law and has a negative impact on targeted communities, including social isolation, self-censorship, the fragmentation and impairment of transnational political and social advocacy networks, and psychological and social harm. Despite this, international law does little to restrain this practice. Building on momentum around the regulation of mercenary spyware and transnational repression, this article elaborates on how States could consider regulating dissident cyber espionage and streamlines a unified approach among ratifying States addressing issues such as State immunity, burden of proof, export control and international and public–private sector collaboration.

This article theorises the repressive security practices of authoritarian states in the context of transnationalism and globalisation. While emerging research on transnational repression has identified a range of extraterritorial and exceptional security practices adopted by authoritarian states, it has not fully studied the implications of such practices on space and statecraft. Using data from the Central Asia Political Exile Database project (CAPE) and interviews conducted with exiled Tajik opposition groups based in Russia and Europe, we theorise the spatial connections between the territorial and extraterritorial security practices using the concept of assemblages. We further outline how these practices escalate in a three-stage model, in which exiles go on notice, are detained and then rendered or assassinated. Such an approach sheds light on the inherent links between the normalisation of security practices and the creation of transnational space with distinct forms of geographical state power that is embedded in non-national spaces and is manifested through spatially organised actors, networks, and technologies within assemblages.