This chapter presents the theoretical framework ensuring the political equality of citizens, resulting in their ability to hold decision-makers to account. Arguing that the principal–agent framework is not suitable for conceptualising accountability beyond the state, it argues that accountability should be understood as a value in itself, rather than a mechanism. Drawing on sociological and philosophical approaches to solidarity and the cosmopolitan literature on equality, the framework argues for an equilibrium between the principles of solidarity and equality that better provides for the political equality of citizens as the central normative concern of accountability. The chapter then applies this normative framework to the Economic and Monetary Union. By exploring the Treaties and the existing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the chapter finally defines the notions of the individual, equality, solidarity, and the common interest.

The Conclusion of the book joins the theoretical propositions from Chapters 1 and 2 with the empirical findings from the case studies carried out in Chapters 3–5. It is here that an assessment is made of how legal accountability has so far been able to ensure that decision-makers in the EMU are held to account by politically equal citizens. In addition, the Conclusion imagines how judicial review should look like according to the normative proposal from Chapter 2. As a final message, the Conclusion underlines the limits of judicial review in respect of democratic deliberation and participation that is to shape and sustain the common interest.