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Concerns about what is characterised today as dumping are not new.1 Initial responses to dumping are found in the Brussels Sugar Convention of 19022 and Canada’s first national anti-dumping law in 1904.3 Other common law countries soon followed.4 The issue of dumping was discussed both at the League of Nations and during the 1933 World Economic Conference.5 During the 1946 post-war negotiations of the ITO Charter, the United States proposed an anti-dumping provision modelled on its own Anti-Dumping Act of 1921. There was general agreement among the negotiating parties on the need to address anti-dumping in the ITO Charter. Already at that time, the focus was on developing disciplines governing the use of anti-dumping laws instead of prohibiting dumping.
This chapter seeks to identify the particularities of the AFSJ relevant to delineating the scope of the Charter. It outlines the regime governing the application of the Charter pursuant to Article 51(1) and describes how this regime plays out in the AFSJ. It also clarifies the role of other criteria traditionally used to determine scope, such as territorial, personal and temporal considerations. The chapter focuses on some of the particularities affecting the determination of the scope of the Charter in the AFSJ. It is suggested that, more than merely an interesting field to test the general limits of EU fundamental rights, the AFSJ represents a specific area of law that has moved the Charter into a more central position in EU case law, thereby consolidating the role and identity of the CJEU as a fundamental rights court.
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