Chapter 5 applies the argument of this book to the beginning of the Macron presidency. Initially, Macron implemented a series of liberalizing reforms, notably of taxation, collective bargaining, and the national railways, often over the opposition of strikers and demonstrators. However, after just eighteen months in office, simmering resentment erupted into the so-called yellow vest protests, a movement against higher gasoline taxes that spiraled into a broader contestation of the government itself. Chapter 5 shows that both the social anesthesia state and skinny politics contributed to the yellow vest movement. In a context of scarce fiscal resources due to the social anesthesia state, Macron’s desire to bolster French business through tax cuts while reducing France’s budget deficit necessarily entailed tax increases and cutbacks in public and social services for the general population. Further fueling contestation, Macron adopted an extreme form of skinny politics, disdaining negotiations with political elites and the social partners, and imposing reforms from above. The combination of unpopular reform, much of it liberal in nature, and skinny politics sparked the yellow vest protests. In the end, the yellow vests forced Macron to backtrack from his agenda, sent his approval ratings plummeting, and weakened his capacity to govern.

The chapter begins by detailing the massive economic support packages announced as the first COVID-19 lockdown was imposed and the accompanying promise to provide the NHS with ‘whatever it takes’. It shows how Conservative small-state ideology was jettisoned and a ‘magic money tree’ found that pushed up the annual budget deficit from £55 to £355 billion, 17 per cent of GDP. It will suggest that, in the light of this, people might question how necessary the preceding years of austerity had been, arguing that austerity in fact lowered economic growth, failed to pay down any of the massive debt from the financial crash and was based on flawed analysis.It will strongly refute the idea that the unprecedented costs of the lockdown must now be ‘paid for’ and the reckoning must come soon. Using detailed historical comparisons and arguments about the peculiar opportunity that negative real interest rates provide, it shows that we can accommodate a rise in the national debt without yet more austerity cuts to public services. The costs of the pandemic response can and should be treated in the same way that the one-off costs of war were in the past – paid off over the long term.