The current relationship between UK and Strasbourg is politically fraught, which presents inevitable challenges for both jurisdictions. This article will analyse how the Strasbourg Court has responded to these challenges when dealing with applications against the UK, particularly when an application is brought following determination by the UK Supreme Court. It will be argued that there is some evidence that the Strasbourg Court has recently been using the admissibility stage as a novel site for effecting strategic behaviour, in order to moderate and influence UK–Strasbourg relations. The effect of this recent inclination, and some possible justifications for it, will then be set out.

I examine gubernatorial use of executive orders, and assess how executive action influences statute adoption. I argue that strong governors use executive orders to pursue policy objectives when they perceive legislation as unlikely to pass. Multilevel Event History Analysis of executive orders and the adoption of statutes that protect the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community from 1975 to 2013 reveals that partisan control of government and intrastate factors influence both forms of policy adoption. My findings support the strategic model that argues that executives turn to executive orders when confronting unfavourable legislative conditions, and that governors issue protections more when entering office. Legislatures respond to partisan control of the legislature and social characteristics. Further, states that have pro-LGBT executive orders in place are more likely to adopt similar statutes. My results suggest that stronger governors are more likely to issue executive orders, but it is states with weaker governors that are more likely to adopt legislation.