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2 results

  • 4 - The Limits of General WTO Rules

  • Henry Gao, Singapore Management University, Weihuan Zhou, University of New South Wales, Sydney
  • Book:
    Between Market Economy and State Capitalism
    Published online:
    10 November 2022
    Print publication:
    24 November 2022, pp 69-96

  • Summary

    Chapter 4 explores the utility of different WTO rules in disciplining market-distortive behaviour of SOEs and subsidies, including GATT rules on import monopolies, state trading enterprises (STEs), transparency, and anti-dumping (AD) measures. In our view, these rules are all of limited utilities, albeit for different reasons: the rules on import monopolies and STEs are quite narrow in terms of the coverage of policy instruments and the prescribed obligations, the transparency obligation is rather tooth-less, while the ability to use AD measures to deal with market distortions due to state intervention has been curtailed by the Appellate Body (AB) in recent cases.

  • Measuring Inefficiency in the Presence of an Export Tax, an Import Tariff, and a State Trading Enterprise

  • Troy G. Schmitz
  • Journal:
    Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics / Volume 34 / Issue 1 / April 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 April 2015, pp. 81-93

  • Agricultural sales cooperative unions (ASCUs) in Turkey are heavily influenced by both domestic and international government policies. Both export taxes and import tariffs are used as policy tools to regulate cotton markets. Domestic price support programs, water subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, and credit subsidies have also been used as domestic policy tools. These types of subsidies are not uncommon among developing countries. This paper provides empirical estimates of the degree of economic inefficiency associated with government intervention in Turkish cotton markets. A two-region partial equilibrium model of cotton exports and imports is developed under the “small country assumption” to obtain empirical estimates of the deadweight welfare loss associated with these government subsidies. Although government intervention results in significant income distribution among the various cotton sectors within Turkey, the overall economic inefficiency of the redistribution is very low.