This article examines the extent to which state officials are shielded from foreign jurisdiction by functional immunity when they stand accused of committing international crimes. It argues that the development of the principle of individual responsibility for international crimes should be understood as posing a limit to the operation of the rule of functional immunity. States have agreed that international crimes, even when committed within the context of the ostensible exercise of state authority under international law, do not qualify as official acts for functional immunity purposes since they can no longer be solely attributed to the state and not to the official personally. The article thereby takes issue with the increasingly popular conceptualization of functional immunity in terms of an act of state immunity, in which attribution, rather than exclusive attribution, is the controlling notion. It does acknowledge that international law may pose limits on the competence of national courts to establish jurisdiction in certain circumstances, but proposes to undo the discussion of the shackles of immunity law and to recognize the operation of an alternative, less far-reaching legal principle.

This article examines the reasoning and findings of the International Court of Justice in its judgment in Djibouti v. France on issues pertaining to the immunities and inviolability of state officials. While recognizing the Court's contribution to the clarification of certain aspects of the legal regime of the immunities and inviolability of state officials, the article emphasizes a number of points on which a clear response cannot be found in the judgment. Moreover, some concerns or doubts are raised about the way in which the Court dealt with certain issues regarding, in particular, the classification of immunities, their scope, their implementation, and the acts precluded by their operation. The Court's judgment clearly shows the complexities surrounding the legal treatment of numerous aspects of a topic which continues to be of the highest importance and sensitivity in international law and international relations.