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Social pugnacity is a complex and contextual phenomenon. As argued in the previous chapters its dynamics is shaped by variety of factors including coercive-organisational capacity, the extent of ideological penetration, and the intensity of micro-interactional bonds. Although people can fight for economic, political, ideological, and other reasons social pugnacity can never be reduced to individual motivations only. Instead, a combat experience has its own social dynamics that is shaped by the changing social environment. This relates not only to Clausewitz’s (2008 [1832]) well-known fog of war that always generates uncertainties and unpredictable behaviour, but even more importantly violent conflicts impact profoundly and are in turn impacted by the changing group dynamics. Wars, revolutions, insurgencies, and other forms of organised violence are dependent as much on the strength and endurance of the macro-organisational structures as the micro-group ties. The link between these two is often established through shared ideological narratives. However, it is not completely clear how this process operates in practice. Do form, size, or shape of the armed organisation influence one’s willingness to fight? Are fighters involved in clandestine political movements or criminal syndicates motivated by the same principles as those fighting in formal military organisations? What specific role do organisational structures, economic incentives, coercive pressure, and ideology play in individual and collective decisions to fight?
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