Meredith’s novels abound in sentences, understood not just as the verbal form that contains a subject and a predicate, ending in a period, but as sententiae or maxims, which express a general truth or opinion in striking and memorable terms. A long-time feature of argument and rhetoric, sententiae are intimately associated with the development of oral and written prose, though their presence in Meredith’s work has led to the accusation that his novels are excessively poetic. This essay adopts a genealogical approach to Meredith’s style by tracing the development of his earliest sententiae to their recognizably mature form. With roots in the “wisdom” tradition in ancient prophecy and philosophy, Meredith’s sententiae reflect an ideal of cultivated speech historically associated with intelligent conversation and drama, which he then assimilated to narrative fiction. The singularity of the Meredithian sentence – a metaphorically dense and syntactically complex assertion that blends idiosyncratic expression with judgments of common sense – thus arises from synthetic hybridity, overlaying didacticism with description and intellection with image.

It is a mistake to think that Ben Jonson spent his time and art in a disapproving posture toward Ovid as the boldest of the Augustan love poets. This chapter treats a large body of evidence in what may be viewed as Jonson’s repertoire, all of which testify to his great respect for Ovid and his sense of duty to defend the liberties the Roman poet and his Elizabethan imitators took with the decorums of the early empire. The chapter deals with his marginal notes in his personal copies of classical texts, the commentaries in the humanist texts he consulted, his poems and plays, and his subsequent commentators. Of particular interest are Jonson’s marginal notes on his personal copy of Martial; his poetic sequence The Forest; and especially his play Poetaster, or the Arraignment, both in its dramatic iteration and its textual forms. Jonson’s work on the poetry of Ovid and his successors shows, above all, that he wished to cast himself as Ovid’s public defender, a legal advocate of the Roman poet’s boldness in exercising the liberty of speech.