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The chapter argues that the main extant views of the nature of evidence one has lack the resources to account for the impermissibility of cases of resistance to evidence. I first examine classic internalist, seemings-based evidentialism and argue that it fails to account for evidence resistance. This, I argue, is an in-principle problem: internalist evidentialism cannot recover from this because it is internalist.
Humans continually make judgments that some things have more value than others. Plausibly, it is largely through our value judgments that God intends to guide us in setting priorities and goals. This Element surveys leading accounts of what value judgments are exactly. It then explores the particular values we are apparently sensitive to when making two judgments endemic to human life: about what makes a life good, and about who deserves a good life. Connections are made between differing analyses of human value judgments and views about God's character and the goals God is prompting us to pursue.
Ernest Sosa has recently presented three challenges for evidentialism. The challenges concern what is required for epistemically justified judging and suspending of judgment. The aim of this article is to respond to these challenges on behalf of the evidentialist. Importantly, responding to Sosa's challenges requires giving substance to the idea of appreciating what one's evidence supports. This idea has been mentioned by prominent evidentialists but not given adequate development. Hence, this article marks a significant move forward in the understanding of evidentialism as well as a defense of the theory from Sosa's prima facie serious objections.
This chapter examines various foundationalist theories of justification. We consider the regress argument for foundationalism, classical and modest foundationalism, and Phenomenal Conservatism.
According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.
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