This chapter turns to Herodotus’ unique narratorial reticence in making firm truth claims. "What is said" and "what seems" are found with much greater frequency than "what is true." Juxtaposing the Histories with contemporary discussions on epistemology will demonstrate the extent to which truth was problematized as a standard of inquiry in the fifth century. The narrator’s response to this is to use truth as an elusive criterion in order to highlight the difficulty of meeting its conditions. The final portion of this chapter looks to the frequency of "veridical" εἰμί in the Histories and points to its status as a criterion of accuracy in Presocratic epistemology. It argues for its incorporation in historical narrative as a distinctive marker of epistemic certainty.

This chapter offers an opinionated overview of the role of evidence when it comes to the justification of religious beliefs. After clarifying what is meant by “Evidentialism,” the chapter turns to an examination of two central objections that have been pressed against Evidentialist theories of justification. The first objection is that traditional Evidentialist theories make the justification of religious beliefs too difficult. The second objection is that more recent Evidentialist theories make the justification of religious beliefs too easy. A key finding of the chapter is that a form of seemings-based Evidentialism called “Phenomenal Explanationism” avoids both of these difficulties while providing a plausible account of the relationship between evidence and religious beliefs. Hence, although the chapter does not establish that Evidentialism is correct, it does provide reasons for thinking that Evidentialism should be seriously considered.