This chapter addresses the issue of legality of ‘secondary sanctions’ from the viewpoint of international investment law. The theoretical situation considered is that of a foreign investor, having made an investment in the US, being subjected to penalties or restrictions under a US secondary sanctions regime, based on its conduct of certain transactions with a targeted country or entity, even though such business activities have no US jurisdictional ‘nexus’. The chapter first attempts at identifying the potentially relevant substantive standards of investment protection, including the prohibition of expropriation without compensation and the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard. The likelihood of a successful invocation of these standards by the claimant in an investor–State arbitration claim is discussed. In that process, it is considered inter alia whether the deterrent effect of secondary sanctions may per se amount to a violation of an investment protection instrument. The chapter then turns to the assessment of the possible defences that the respondent State may put forward in order to seek to escape its liability for the possible breach of a standard of bilateral investment treaties, notably defences relating to ‘security exceptions’ provisions in treaties and allegations as to the ‘illegality’ of the investment.

This chapter considers whether and to what extent secondary sanctions that contravene commitments under trade and investment agreements may be justifiable under security and general exceptions. It analyses the jurisprudence of various international courts and tribunals on the matter, while focusing on the text of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles XX and XXI (which many international economic agreements replicate or adjust). For non-self-judging security exceptions, it concludes, justifiability hinges on the design of sanctions, their targeting of ‘military’ products or services, and the demonstrability of an essential security risk for the sanctioning party. Secondary sanctions might also be justifiable under general exceptions, which feature finer legal criteria to permit measures that pursue legitimate objectives while controlling their abusive application. The chapter considers the enforcement-related exception of GATT Article XX(d), as well as the public morals exception of GATT Article XX(a), which was invoked to justify sanctions in United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China. As with other measures at the intersection between economic relations and security, the assessment of secondary sanctions under these exceptions becomes particularly challenging in light of their usual objective: restricting trade or investment vis-à-vis specified states, on the basis not of impersonal objectives but of a state’s perception of its essential security interests.

Along the path of datafication, the probability of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure increases as well. The weaponization of 5G networks has brought about further challenges to international economic legal order. Major geopolitical players have adopted comprehensive security measures at home and have also strengthened cooperation with geopolitical allies to protect and enhance the resilience of ICT ecosystems. In this regard, the more recent iterations of international trade agreements are equipped with “modernized” security exceptions to ensure that the exceptions to international trade rules are aligned with the policy needs of the data-driven economy. Innovative exception clauses have been incorporated into FTAs to reconcile conflicts between (digital) trade and (cyber) security, which, overall, grant a dramatically expansive scope and excessively unfettered discretion to states when it comes to “national security.” Questions as to what constitutes “critical infrastructure” and how it should be designated, however, require due process mechanisms to constrain discretionary abuse. Chapter 2 contends that a consensus concerning the scope of “critical infrastructure” would be politically and economically valuable to filter out overgeneralizations of national security claims.

The chapter analyses how trade agreements balance liberalisation of digital trade with cybersecurity concerns. The chapter identifies the strengths, weaknesses, and ambiguities facing digital trade regulation in these agreements. As a way to address the tension between international trade law and cybersecurity, it examines security exception clauses in different trade agreements. It also analyses the efforts found in recent regional trade agreements to direct state parties to have regard to international standards concerning cybersecurity issues. It concludes that harmonisation of such standards would suggest the possibility of a greater coherence in cybersecurity governance.