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Digital platforms are marketplaces where a variety of participants gather to exchange goods, information, or services. This chapter examines what makes digital platforms special kinds of marketplaces. Platforms create value by allowing users to connect with each other and interact or transact in some way. The additional benefits include improved matching, trust, and liquidity, and lower costs of search and transaction. Digital platforms may thus create exceptionally efficient markets. However, the market for platforms themselves is anything but competitive and efficient. The benefits of scale in markets are not surprising, but the ability of digital markets to scale globally is much more recent. After platforms achieve critical mass, there is often no point for a rival to even enter, at least if the entrant offers no radical innovation. As a result, network effects allow platforms to concentrate vast market power.
Consumer choice of differentiated products, such as wine, depends on the composition of the choice set consumers are choosing from. However, choice sets are often situationally defined through wine-tasting lists or displayed wines in a particular tasting and sales environment. In this paper, we use an experiment to explicitly modify the saliency of wine options available outside the tasting room choice set and the amount of sensory information available about the wines before wine tasting. We explicitly test whether consumer regret and fear of missing out on alternative options or consumer search costs are more likely to drive behavior around large choice sets. We find that increasing the saliency of outside options decreases one's propensity to taste the wines available for tasting and purchase immediately, while changing search costs through sensory descriptions does not affect tasting behavior. This provides support for the anticipated regret and fear of missing out motivations for behavior around large wine-tasting lists.
Using unique panel data on individual transactions between buyers and sellers in the spot market for live hogs, we found a large degree of intra-day price dispersion. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we offer an explanation which is rooted in the bargaining with search theory. We formulate three hypotheses involving the role of farmers’ search cost, bargaining parties’ patience, and asymmetric information that we believe can explain the observed phenomenon. Empirical analysis shows strong support for all three of the stated theoretical predictions, indicating that the bargaining with search theory explains at least 31 percent of the observed intra-day price variation in this market.
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