The impact pre-harvest hedging and crop insurance strategies have on expected revenue and associated risk as well as how producers' risk attitudes affect optimal strategies was analyzed for Kansas wheat farms. No insurance, Catastrophic (CAT), Actual Production History (APH), and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) were considered. Average revenue was similar across alternatives, but APH and CRC resulted in the least income variability. Risk reduction effects of hedging were small and the advantage of CRC over APH decreases as hedging increases. This historical study provides useful information; however, if future market conditions differ significantly from the past, optimal strategies may change.

We estimate actuarially fair premium rates for yield and revenue insurance for Georgia and South Carolina peaches. The premium rates for both products decrease at a decreasing rate as the mean farm-level yield increases. In general, the premium rate for revenue insurance exceeds the premium rate for yield insurance for a given coverage level and expected yield. Although the revenue and yield insurance rates differ in a statistical sense, they do not appear to differ in an economic sense except at high coverage levels for growers with very high yields.

We analyze the effects of crop insurance and the Marketing Loan Program onoptimal nitrogen use and acreage allocation for a case cotton–sorghum farmin Texas. A mathematical programming model is used to solve for the optimalnitrogen fertilizer rate, crop acreage allocation, coverage level, and priceelection factor, along with participation in the crop insurance and theMarketing Loan Program for both crops. Results show that depending on thecrop and farmer risk aversion, these federal risk management programsincrease or decrease optimal fertilizer rates –6% to 3%, increase optimalcotton acreage 94% to 144%, and decrease sorghum acres up to 50%.

The 1996 Farm Act and the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform Act are recent examples of policy changes that have increased risks for U.S. farmers. New products are emerging to help farmers manage risks. This article examines some of the policy changes, farmer responses, and new risk-sharing products. The focus turns to the new revenue insurance products and their potential in the South. While there are reasons to believe revenue insurance should be attractive in the South, any revenue products that use existing crop insurance rates will face difficulties since poor actuarial performance in the South has resulted in relatively high rates.

Moving from price-triggered to area revenue–triggered programs was perhaps the most common theme among 2007 farm bill proposals. Area revenue–triggered commodity programs may make farm-level revenue insurance products seem redundant, raising questions about why the federal government should continue both programs. Area revenue–triggered programs would remove much of the systemic risk faced by producers. As a result, private sector insurers may be able to insure the residual risk without federal involvement. This paper examines the effects of moving to area revenue–triggered commodity programs with a focus on public policy issues that would likely arise.