Datafication-enabled advertising and other datafication practices, in the absence of proper constraints, will deepen the perils of datafication. A set of cross-border competition disciplines proposed in Chapter 5 may well be an effective instrument to address problems associated with platform monopolies and data capitalism. In this way, there would be less need for ex-post competition law enforcement in developing countries and LDCs, where relatively limited resources can be allocated to combat digital cartels and data monopolization. In this context, algorithmic transparency can serve as a starting point for global platform governance. The case study in Chapter 5 investigates the key dimensions of platform transparency requirements in a comparative context and demonstrates that the fragmentation of platform regulation is growing. The proliferation of platform regulations and algorithmic disciplines may place SMEs in an even more difficult situation vis-à-vis big tech companies, which have the resources necessary to manage different legal requirements in different countries. Despite the inherent complexity of the political economy surrounding digital capitalism, Chapter 5 concludes that there are reasons to be optimistic about better governance through international trade agreements.

Corruption is a current and complex problem with significant effects on trade. For example, at the time of writing the US Justice Department was intervening in a case against a large a pharmaceutical company. It was alleged that the company was responsible for a scheme of drug price increases in the US, as it “ … bribed doctors and their staffs to increase sales.” The price of the drug, addressing infant seizure disorder, had increased 97,000% since the year 2000. Also, many of the affected sales were driven by Medicare reimbursements.1 This case suggests that corruption may:Corruption is also a concern in a global perspective. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres, when addressing the UN Security Council on the issue of corruption in post-war territories, stated that “Corruption robs schools, hospitals and others of vitally needed funds,” with negative effects on people’s rights, foreign investment, and the economy. Based on the World Economic Forum, the cost of corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, or five percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Bank, businesses and individuals pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year.2 Finally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), through its Clean Government Initiative, has identified at least four negative effects of corruption, namely:The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) builds upon international instruments on corruption. It addresses them differently, by adhering to their principles, encouraging their observance, or mandating their ratification or accession. The list of instruments includes (Art. 26.6)

In today’s broader context of resistance to the expansion of international trade, particularly in the United States (with its rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)) and the United Kingdom (with its rejection of the European Union), the regulatory coherence chapter of the TPP is highly relevant. Its cross-cutting sectoral approach and use of industry-specific annexes to reduce technical or regulatory barriers to trade is likely to serve as the model for all future multilateral trade treaties. Moreover, even though the TPP was rejected by the Trump administration, it later rose as the CPTPP. The United States may still participate in some form. Recently, the United Kingdom expressed an interest in becoming a party. Ambitious trade deals like the TPP sometimes take decades to finalize. In any case, both the substantive provisions and the architectural structure of a highly negotiated free trade agreement (FTA) like the TPP are quite enduring, so the TPP’s regulatory coherence mechanics are likely to re-surface in future FTAs. In other words, the current form of the TPP will serve as a model for any future TPP or similar mega-regional FTA.

Chapter 3 explores whether ASEAN displays the attributes of an optimal regulatory convergence area for services, examining a number of factors likely to challenge the pursuit of an integration agenda in policy environment characterized by a continued aversion towards more institutionalized forms of normative convergence and the regional pooling of regulatory sovereignty that a sustained commitment to deep integration generally requires in the services field.