• ◦ This case study illustrates how a particular auction design, used for public procurement, can unintentionally provide fertile ground for bidding rings.

• ◦ Essentially, the average bid auction format awards the contract to the bidder whose bid is nearest to the average bid. The average bid auction format has been advocated in order to prevent contracts being awarded to bidders with unrealistically low bids that might result in low quality or ex post renegotiation.

• ◦ This case study shows how it facilitates collusion. The setting is the tendering of public work projects in Turin, Italy over 2000–2003 where subgroups of construction firms formed cartels and coordinated their bids to enhance their chance of winning the contract at an inflated price.

• ◦ To understand the ease with which bidders can collude when participating in an average bid auction, suppose the current expectation (in the absence of coordination) is that firms bid aggressively. In order to have a chance to win, a firm would have to submit a relatively low bid in order for it to be close to the average bid. Now consider firms forming a cartel. All they need to do is agree to submit high prices. That will reap higher profits and without the temptation to deviate as is present with the usual auction design where the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. A firm that thinks about submitting a lower bid will move its bid farther away from the average bid and thus reduce its chances of winning. Once firms agree to submit high bids, such an agreement is self-enforcing. The average bid auction format thus makes collusion more likely because cartel stability is so easy to maintain.

• ◦ The case study also explores an incentive for a subset of firms to form its own coalition in order to increase their chances of winning. If it comprises enough firms, they can move the average bid up or down in a manner to cause their bids to be closer to the average bid than the bids of firms outside of their coalition. As a result, a collection of bidders can respond to a coalition by forming its own coalition. The proliferation of these coalitions is well documented for the Turin case.

• ◦ This understanding of cartel conduct is used to develop a marker for collusion based on the frequency of joint participation.

Explains the several dozen policy tools governments have used in the past and use today to impose effective industrial policies on their economies.

In this chapter we ask how values and ethics in AI development can be incentivized by governments. We start out from the difficulty acknowledged in the rapidly growing field of AI ethics that the many proposals for ethical AI - or Human Centered AI (HCAI) – lack strong incentives for developers and users to adhere to them. The crucial insight from this chapter is from the use of a we simple theoretical model which shows how public procurement of innovation can incentivize the development of HCAI.

In legal procedures, sanction is understood as a means to put a law into effect, by which the legal subject is compelled to comply with the law by providing incentives for compliance or penalties for infringement. To be effective, sanction needs to have a deterrent effect on the wrongdoer. Competition law sanction varies in different jurisdictions and may include rules of an administrative, private, and criminal law nature. In Indonesia, the competition authority can impose administrative sanctions. However, the law also provides for criminal sanction for the infringement, for which it requires a court decision. The law itself does not mention private sanctions. In practice, it is debatable whether it would be possible to claim damages from a competition law infringer via court. The study is divided into two parts. First, it focuses on sanctioning in competition law in Indonesia: while sanctions usually require a deterrent effect, two issues need further clarification. Secondly, it addresses the challenges needing to be overcome to establish an ASEAN competition law and ASEAN competition law enforcement body, and the attempts to harmonize competition laws of member countries.

This chapter considers the post-Brexit procurement law landscape. While the UK procurement regime has undoubtedly changed, post-Brexit procurement remains both relatively detailed and relatively prescriptive, once the TCA, the position arising from the Protocol, and current UK government proposals for the future of public procurement are considered together. That said, the potential for greater flexibility in the future remains. Greater latitude clearly arises In respect of sub-threshold contracts, although increased flexibility may result in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) losing important market access opportunities. Incorporation of secondary policies – social, labour and environmental objectives – into the procurement process has previously been closely regulated by the EU due to concerns of facilitating disguised ‘economic nationalism’, and thus an opportunity for expanding their use arises post-Brexit. Early indications are that there is an interest in pursuing this opportunity.

Chapter three examines several selected instruments created to regulate SOEs at international, regional and domestic level and seeks to determine their effect on international law. At international level the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the OECD Guidelines on the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, the OECD Common Approaches for Officially Supported Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence, the ILO Tripartite Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Sovereign Wealth Funds Generally Accepted Principles and Practices and the Global Compact are particularly relevant for SOEs. At regional level, public procurement may represent a key regulatory opportunity for SOEs from a human rights perspective and to this end this section provides an analysis of the EU Public Procurement Directives. The section on domestic approaches to SOE regulation analyses measures that have been taken by several States to address the human rights dimension of State corporate ownership.

Mobilising capital for a sustainable economy requires action on two fronts. Current capital allocation must be shifted from an unsustainable pathway to a sustainable one and the investment gap must be filled to ensure that sustainable economy objectives are achieved; this includes fulfilment of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This chapter focuses on the latter issue: filling the investment gap. Primarily, it focuses on the example of tackling the climate change challenge, although these ideas can be applied to the wider environmental and social agendas too. It discusses how to: understand and articulate investment needs; adapt market arrangements using policy to encourage investment; improve the efficacy with which public finance crowds in private finance; and ensure impact through positive real economy outcomes. Throughout the chapter, real-world examples of the 'policy prescriptions' are offered to turn theory into practice.

Do firms with directors holding elected political office benefit from political connections? Restricting the analysis to elections in single-member districts, this chapter uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of gaining political ties, comparing outcomes of firms that are directed by candidates who either won or lost close elections to regional legislatures. Having a connection to a winning politician increases a firm’s revenue by 60 percent and profitability by 15 percent over a term in office. The chapter then tests between different mechanisms, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats, and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. The value of winning a seat increases in more politically competitive regions, but falls markedly when more businesspeople win office in a convocation. Politically connected firms extract fewer benefits when faced with greater competition from other rent-seekers.

This chapter investigates whether businessperson politicians actually govern differently. I argue that given their preferences and managerial expertise, businesspeople in office may adopt policies favorable to the business community and improve government efficiency. To test these claims, I collect data on over 33,000 Russian mayors and legislators and investigate policy outcomes using detailed municipal budgets and over a million procurement contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, the results show that businessperson politicians increase expenditures on roads and transport, while leaving health and education spending untouched. Prioritizing economic over social infrastructure brings immediate benefits to firms, while holding back long-term accumulation of human capital. However, businesspeople do not reduce budget deficits, but rather adopt less competitive methods for selecting contractors, particularly in corruption-ripe construction. In all, businessperson politicians do more to make government run for business, rather than like a business.

Chapter 12 examines the main tenets of the current EU action on accessibility for persons with disabilities and identify the most relevant provisions in the EU legal framework. It analyses the relevant accessibility legislation that predates the conclusion of the CRPD as well as more recent regulations and directives in the domains of the physical environment, transportation, information and communications. It also briefly discusses accessibility of cultural goods and services, including audiovisual services. Then, the chapter turns to an examination of the proposal for a European Accessibility Act, which is currently under discussion in the EU legislative institutions. Additionally, the chapter examines accessibility requirements in public procurement legislation, and succinctly addresses the role of standardisation in guaranteeing accessibility. Finally, it goes on to discuss the role of state aid law and policy in fostering accessibility and in promoting the rights of persons with disabilities.

Chapter 12 examines the main tenets of the current EU action on accessibility for persons with disabilities and identify the most relevant provisions in the EU legal framework. It analyses the relevant accessibility legislation that predates the conclusion of the CRPD as well as more recent regulations and directives in the domains of the physical environment, transportation, information and communications. It also briefly discusses accessibility of cultural goods and services, including audiovisual services. Then, the chapter turns to an examination of the proposal for a European Accessibility Act, which is currently under discussion in the EU legislative institutions. Additionally, the chapter examines accessibility requirements in public procurement legislation, and succinctly addresses the role of standardisation in guaranteeing accessibility. Finally, it goes on to discuss the role of state aid law and policy in fostering accessibility and in promoting the rights of persons with disabilities.