Chapter 5 conducts a comparative case study analysis across ten presidential administrations in six countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Venezuela) using national-level government policies as the unit of analysis. By varying exposure to Chinese state-to-state ?nancing over time, it compares periods of large-scale Chinese bilateral ?nancing to periods of extensive multilateral ?nancing (i.e. where countries have IMF and World Bank programs). Chapter 5 finds that governments that directly contract Chinese financing bilaterally are more likely to use these credit lines to cover budgetary shortfalls in exchange for future oil delivery or nontendered concessions to Chinese ?rms and machinery suppliers. Notably, it also finds that extensive Chinese state-to-state financing frameworks that replace public procurement laws, such as those used in Ecuador and Venezuela, are more likely to yield expansive fiscal expansions than project-level financing that is legally exempt fromexisting public procurement frameworks.

Chapter 6 conducts a comparative case study analysis across ?ve presidential administrations in two countries (Argentina and Brazil) using national-level government policies as the unit of analysis. By varying exposure to market-oriented ?nancing over time, it examines how Chinese state-backed ?nancing compares with private-market ?nancing when it is channeled to corporate enterprises through public tender.A robust private sector and strong constitutional commitment to public procurement tend to increase the resiliency and efficacy of public procurement laws . Under these conditions,public procurements laws compel Chinese policy banks to operate through government concessions rather than direct state-to-state lending, leaving national governments with little additional fiscal space. They instead pursue policy conditionality (i.e. fiscal discipline) to improve their sovereign credit standing and ultimately to lower their project financing costs.