Ordinary language users do in fact use RIGHT and WRONG in ways that permit of degrees, as pointed out in Chapter 1, but advocates of the binary theory may question the philosophical relevance of this. Meaning tracks use, but it is not certain that the current meanings (and uses) of RIGHT and WRONG are optimal. Gradualists need to show that the gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG used by laypeople are better than their binary rivals and ought to be adopted by moral philosophers. The focus of this chapter is on what I call the argument from conflicting reasons. This argument seeks to show that gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG enable moral theorists to articulate nuanced verdicts about moral conflicts, which cannot be expressed in binary theories. The gist of the argument is as follows: Some moral conflicts are irresolvable, and in those cases the deontic properties of acts favored and disfavored by conflicting reasons cannot be accurately captured by binary deontic verdicts.

The negative effect doctrine discussed in this chapter deals with when, if ever, a state court will stay proceedings before it and refer disputants to the arbitrators for them to decide, in the first instance, whether an arbitration agreement between the parties (i) exists, (ii) is valid, and (iii) has a scope that covers the dispute in question. An affirmative answer on each of these points would mean that the dispute’s merits must be decided in arbitration. Thus, the negative effect issue concerns whether a decision on these three jurisdiction sub-issues should be decided with finality by the court itself at the outset, or, in the first instance, by the arbitrators themselves, with possible court review on jurisdiction delayed until later.The chapter discusses the dramatically different approaches to the negative effect issue followed in several leading arbitral jurisdictions: France, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, the U.K., and Canada (Quebec).It also discusses the underlying policy issues at stake in the different national approaches to the doctrine.In conclusion the chapter offer’s the author’s view of a preferred approach to the negative effect issue.

[36.1] Statutory powers confer authority that enables a person or body to do what would otherwise be illegal or ineffective. They do so in two broad ways: by conferring discretions and imposing duties. This chapter focuses on the meanings of ‘may’, ‘shall’ and ‘must’ and on a question of characterisation that often arises in relation to them: namely, should the words be characterised as conferring a discretion or as imposing a duty, at least in certain circumstances?1

[42.1] A statutory offence may contain, expressly or by implication, a proposition as to a state of mind. At common law the state of mind that an offence contains is known as ‘mens rea’.