Caldwell focuses on how the experience of the Weimar Republic’s failure influenced the formation of Germany’s second democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany. It highlights how the actors who shaped the Bonn Republic actively compared Weimar and Bonn: The “Weimar analogy” here was not an abstraction, but highly present both as a lesson and as a trauma. “Bonn’s Weimar” demonstrates how a historical analogy may work in practice and it proceeds to make several general arguments about the way the analogies work. In particular, the chapter shows that there was never one Weimar analogy but that it is mobilized in different ways, by different actors, to make sense of democracy’s failure.

Scheuerman engages with the right-wing mobilization of “Weimar lessons” in the context of the contemporary US political landscape. The chapter focuses specifically on how the political thought of German Jewish émigré political philosopher Leo Strauss was used by supporters of the Trump Administration in academic circles, based primarily at the Claremont Institute. The Weimar analogy has often been mobilized to highlight the dangers of antidemocratic political forces. The chapter, however, serves as a reminder that the redeployment of Weimar and stories about its legacy can be instrumentalized to serve authoritarian as well as anti-authoritarian purposes.

This chapter puts Donald Trump’s populism in comparative perspective by applying the theory developed in chapter 2 and substantiated in chapters 3 to 5 to the US case. My analysis highlights the great institutional strength of US democracy and the unlikelihood of acute and severe crises and of huge windfalls, given the complexity and prosperity of US economy and society. As a result, populism is exceedingly unlikely to suffocate US democracy -- contrary to recent observers’ fears. The chapter substantiates these arguments through an in-depth examination of the Trump experience, which establishes intense partisan and affective polarization as another obstacle to the American populist’s ability to boost his mass support. Trump’s haphazard agency and very mixed governing performance created further limiations. Therefore, despite Trump’s relentless challenges to liberal norms and long-established institutions, US democracy held firm, even during the unprecedented post-electoral crisis of 2020/21. Indeed, the US’s vibrant civil society spearheaded a pro-democratic backlash that brought the electoral defeat of a populist leader who never managed to garner majority support in a highly polarized polity.

This chapter highlights the global wave of populism and the intense fears about democracy’s fate to which it has given rise. I explain why indeed, populism inherently threatens liberal democracy. Then I summarize my main argument, namely that this danger is often averted; consequently, populism’s effective threat is much less severe than often feared. Instead, the analysis of a comprehensive set of populist experiences in Latin America and Europe shows that under many circumstances, democracy proves resilient to populism’s threat; populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only under special, restrictive conditions. The chapter then defines the central terms, namely democracy, democracy’s destruction, and populism; for the latter, heavily contested concept, I employ my political-strategic definition, whose conceptual validity and analytical value I thoroughly explain. Finally, I justify the study’s focus on Latin America, Europe, and the USA and preview the subsequent chapters with brief summaries of the main arguments and findings.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which rightwing, neoliberal populism managed to destroy democracy in Latin America. Only Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000) and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador (2019-present) have accomplished this feat because they benefited from institutional weaknesses of their countries’ presidential systems and, at the same time, managed to resolve two acute, severe crises, in the economy as well as in public security; this “miraculous” success earned them overwhelming political support, which they leveraged for dismantling the remaining checks and balances. Whereas Fujimori ended hyperinflation and defeated a countrywide guerrilla insurgency, presidents who resolved only one such crisis; who failed to overcome such a challenge; or who did not face a crisis at all, did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. And whereas Bukele successfully contained the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic and greatly lowered rampant gang violence, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), who did not face such challenges, was unable to boost his mass support and therefore lost his reelection bid.

My theory argues that populist chief executives manage to concentrate power and asphyxiate democracy only under special, restrictive conditions, namely when a distinctive institutional weakness and a special conjunctural opportunity for achieving overwhelming mass support coincide. I distinguish 3 types of institutional weakness: a) susceptibility to para-legal change in Latin American presidentialism; b) exceptionally high instability in that region; and c) the attenuated checks and balances of European parliamentarism. Conjunctural opportunities arise from huge revenue windfalls, with which populist leaders can “buy” massive support via ample benefit distribution; or from acute, severe, yet resolvable crises: If populist leaders can bring “miraculous” relief, they receive an outpouring of support. As my scoring of 40 cases shows, these institutional weaknesses and conjunctural opportunities combine in ways that correspond to 3 wellknown types of populism. Accordingly, the theory elucidates the unusual conditions under which a few neoliberal populists in Latin America, leftwing, “Bolivarian” populists in Latin America, and rightwing, traditional populists in Europe have destroyed democracy.

This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which leftwing, “Bolivarian” populism managed to destroy democracy in Latin America. Only Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (1999–2013), Evo Morales of Bolivia (2006–2019), and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–2017) accomplished this feat because they benefited from the high instability plaguing their countries’ presidential systems and, at the same time, from the enormous hydrocarbon revenues provided by the global commodities boom. By distributing massive benefits to ample population sectors, they won overwhelming political support, which they leveraged for dismantling the remaining, already battered checks and balances. By contrast, presidents who did not benefit from such a huge windfall or who governed in countries not suffering from high institutional instability did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. Instead, some of these leftwing populists suffered irregular evictions from office, whereas others managed to serve out their terms, but failed to perpetuate themselves in power and strangle democracy.

Chapter 6 explores the possibility of composing higher-order macro-institutions, starting with micro-norms/rules and institutes and their mutual compatibility and balancing. A necessary precondition for power-sharing is monopolisation of destructive resources and ‘legitimate’ violence over a territorial space: the ‘territorial institution’. In territories in which destructive means have been successfully monopolised and there are no challenges to the ruling function, ‘fundamental norms’ or ‘constitutions’ may develop that delineate the institutional regime. The territory, the constitution and the institutional regime are macro-institutions located at the highest level in the vertical layering of institutions and are complex combinations of single norms/rules and institutes. But, as macro-phenomena, they are characterised by emerging properties that cannot exclusively be reduced to lower-level properties. Different regimes rest on the prominence of some institutes over others. In some cases, the predominant institutes damage the others excessively. In other cases, the institutes balance each other. The chapter suggests that institutional analysis generalisations should concern political institutes, their balancing and combination, and the likely effects. Actors’ preferences and constellations of actors should be kept separate from institutional analysis. Adding them results in generalisations concerning the interaction between political institutions and political structures; that is, in the analysis of ‘political regimes’.

In this chapter we review some of the prominent arguments regarding the relationship between political institutions and democracy. In keeping with the theme of this volume we use data from the Varieties of Democracy Project to (re)evaluate these arguments. Specifically, we focus on two primary outcomes of interest – the durability of the democracy/likelihood of breakdown, and the quality or level of democracy. We review the theoretical reasoning connecting state capacity, executive regime type, and the party system to democratic outcomes.We re-evaluate the strength of these theories based on data from V-Dem. We find strong support for the role of state capacity, but mixed or no support for executive regime type or party system variables. Finally, we conclude by discussing the important role of electoral experience in many of our models.

The proposed constitutional organization of the political sphere, including, in a special way, the design of the executive and legislative branches, also reflected assumptions of democratic distrust. In this I explore the imbalance generated within the system of “checks and balances” by strong presidential systems and, in particular, by the presence of what some have called “hyper-presidentialism” (Nino 1997). In fact -I argue- the current system depends on finding a “President-angel” who is capable of and willing to demonstrate the qualities of her character throughout the term of her administration. When, on the contrary, the person elected President does not turn out to be up to the job, or is susceptible to pressure and influence, or takes offense at criticism from society and begins acting in an authoritarian or abusive manner, then the bare reality of the institutional system is revealed. And when this happens, we see that the system, in truth, is incapable of imposing firm control, that it allows abuse to continue, and that it is vulnerable to authoritarian manipulation. This situation -I maintain- should largely be seen as an endogenous product of the institutional system, much more than the result of personal pathologies (authoritarian leaders or unenlightened representatives).

The second Chilean constitutional republican experience is examined, focusing in its authoritarian President, the state of exception and the limitation of rights as well as the rising of new political parties. The Second Republic is the Authoritarian Republic (1830-1870) that is characterized by the dominance of the executive function and the use of states of exception. The debate about the authoritarianism of Latin America in the works of Bello and Lastarria is explained. The first Chilean constitutionalism is compared in the works of the Carrasco Albano and Huneeus is also subject to analysis. This Republic also shows several changes in the structure of rights and of the constitutional property law that is explained. Last but not least, the main political agents and the mutation of the Second Republic into the Third Republic is also explained.

Illiberal democracy is a special constitutional arrangement: it is a plebiscitarian democracy unfolding the totalitarian potential within a democratic system. As a centralized power, it intends to perpetuate the rulers’ monopoly over the state, relying on the falsification of classical (liberal) constitutionalism. These features offer sufficient family resemblance to treat them together for the purposes of constitutional theory. Illiberal democracy takes an instrumental attitude to constitutional institutions. Amendments to the constitution take place according to the momentary interests of the political power, like in any democracy without extremely cumbersome amendment rules. The ultimate attachment to the spirit of the constitution, the idea of respecting an unamendable core, is missing. There is no commitment to underlying principles; appearances matter, not authenticity. Hence the inevitable duplicity and deceit in the constitutional and legal system of illiberal democracy. The constitution is not an entrenched, higher order law but a practical tool to solve emerging conflicts in an illiberal and nondemocratic way (imposing arbitrary will as supreme command).

South Korea is a success story in terms of institutional development. Not only did the country build a high-capacity ‘developmental state’ in the early second half of the 20th century but, towards the end of the 20th century, Koreans also witnessed the replacement of autocratic rule by a liberal democratic regime. The sequencing of these development stages seems to support ‘stateness first’ arguments, which claim that succesful democratization requires certain degrees of infrastructural capacity and citizen agreement. And, in fact, the ‘developmental state’ significantly facilitated the survival and rooting of South Korea’s democracy. However, as this chapter show, the process of state-building under autocratic rule left behind institutional legacies that continue to hinder democratic consolidation – in particular an under-institutionalized party system and a weak civil society. More generally, the chapter shows that the state-democracy nexus can be subject to path-dependent effects.

This chapter focuses on the debates over fundamental principles of state organization that took place in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK’ during Turkey’s 2011–2013 constitution-making process. It discusses the failure of popular constitution making as well as the most recent constitutional changes in the context of a tradition of statist, authoritarian constitutionalism in Turkey. We assess the extent to which disagreements over the fundamental nature of principles of state organization contributed to the failure of popular constitution making in 2013. Our inquiry shows that the diverging conceptions of democracy, separation of powers, and the rule of law of the different parties involved led to extreme tensions. Deep disagreements over these issues and others made compromise impossible. Therefore, the contested subjects subsumed under the principles of state organization contributed significantly to the failure of popular constitution making in Turkey, and cleared the path to majority imposition by the ruling party in subsequent constitution-making and amendment processes.