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This chapter introduces the two main questions that this book attempts to answer. First: Why powers? Second: What are powers like? It also discusses the overlap between metaphysics and science, some differences between powers and qualities, the relationship between properties and substances, how we can know powers, and different types of powers isms. The chapter then distinguishes between networking and nodal accounts of powers before previewing the central idea of the book: the 3d account of powers (a nodal account), which combines two core theses. The first is the Physical Intentionality Thesis, which concerns the fact of physical intentionality: that the power is directed toward manifestations. The second is the Informational Thesis, which concerns the content of physical intentionality: what the power is for or directed toward. Lastly, a roadmap for the rest of the book is provided.
This chapter explores possible differences between powerful qualities and pure powers, argues for the Pure Powers Model, and discusses the problem of being for pure powers. It is argued that powerful qualities are modally indistinguishable from pure powers but have a denser nature. Since pure powers are ontologically simpler than powerful qualities yet equally explanatorily relevant to modality, we should reject powerful qualities. After rejecting the Powerful Qualities Model, the reality of pure powers is defended. If pure powers are to provide a stable basis for physical modality, the problem of their being or grounding during periods of nonmanifestation needs resolution. It is argued that pure powers are self-grounded. A regress argument advanced by Stathis Psillos, which challenges the self-grounding of pure powers, is deflected. Lastly, Point Theory is developed to explain the self-grounding of pure powers.
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