[15.1] An earlier chapter (chapter 6) established the importance of the text in statutory interpretation. The present chapter examines how particular presumptive meanings may be derived from the particular words in doubt. The primary meanings are the ‘literal’, ‘grammatical’, ‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ meanings. Often combined, the presumptive meaning that reading a provision generates may be described, for instance, as the ‘ordinary and grammatical meaning’ and the ‘natural and ordinary meaning’.

This chapter turns to the second step of interpretation, namely content-determination. This exercise can be narrated in two ways: first, by reference to the formal rules of interpretation set forth in the VCLT; second, in light of the assumptions, predispositions, and standards of acceptability shared by the judicial community. The juxtaposition of these accounts highlights the interplay between freedom and constraint in international treaty interpretation. What guides the gaze of the interpreter? Where are the boundaries of their discretion? On the one hand, VCLT rules are powerless before the ontological indeterminacy of legal norms, and have therefore little cash value when it comes to derive exact meaning. On the other hand, the patterned practices and background knowledge of the community impose powerful limitations on the interpreter’s discretion.