Infants struggle to understand familiar words spoken in unfamiliar accents. Here, we examine whether accent exposure facilitates accent-specific adaptation. Two types of pre-exposure were examined: video-based (i.e., listening to pre-recorded stories; Experiment 1) and live interaction (reading books with an experimenter; Experiments 2 and 3). After video-based exposure, Canadian English-learning 15- to 18-month-olds failed to recognize familiar words spoken in an unfamiliar accent. However, after face-to-face interaction with a Mandarin-accented talker, infants showed enhanced recognition for words produced in Mandarin English compared to Australian English. Infants with live exposure to an Australian talker were not similarly facilitated, perhaps due to the lower vocabulary scores of the infants assigned to the Australian exposure condition. Thus, live exposure can facilitate accent adaptation, but this ability is fragile in young infants and is likely influenced by vocabulary size and the specific mapping between the speaker and the listener's phonological system.

As a rule, listening is easier in first (L1) than second languages (L2); difficult L2 listening can challenge even highly proficient users. We here examine one particular listening function, adaptation to novel talkers, in such a high-proficiency population: Dutch emigrants to Australia, predominantly using English outside the family, but all also retaining L1 proficiency. Using lexically-guided perceptual learning (Norris, McQueen & Cutler, 2003), we investigated these listeners’ adaptation to an ambiguous speech sound, in parallel experiments in both their L1 and their L2. A control study established that perceptual learning outcomes were unaffected by the procedural measures required for this double comparison. The emigrants showed equivalent proficiency in tests in both languages, robust perceptual adaptation in their L2, English, but no adaptation in L1. We propose that adaptation to novel talkers is a language-specific skill requiring regular novel practice; a limited set of known (family) interlocutors cannot meet this requirement.

Although historically, treatment of amblyopia has been recommended prior to closure of a critical window in visual development, the existence and duration of that critical window is currently unclear. Moreover, there is clear evidence, both from animal and human studies of deprivation amblyopia, that there are different critical windows for different visual functions and that monocular and binocular deprivation have different neural and behavioral consequences. In view of the spectrum of critical windows for different visual functions and for different types of amblyopia, combined with individual variability in these windows, treatment of amblyopia has been increasingly offered to older children and adults. Nevertheless, treatment beyond the age of 7 years tends to be, on average, less effective than in younger children, and the high degree of variability in treatment response suggests that age is only one of many factors determining treatment response. Newly emerging treatment modalities may hold promise for more effective treatment of amblyopia at older ages. Additional studies are needed to characterize amblyopia by using new and existing clinical tests, leading to improved clinical classification and better prediction of treatment response. Attention also needs to be directed toward characterizing and measuring the impact of amblyopia on the patients’ functional vision and health-related quality of life.

Almost 40 years ago I began what turned out to be a programme of research on the way in which experience can change the effectiveness of the events used as stimuli in standard associative learning procedures. In this personal history I will describe my early (failed) attempts to find evidence for the acquired distinctiveness of cues, and my conclusion that experience tends to reduce, not enhance the associability of stimuli. I then go on to describe my attempts to square this conclusion with the stubborn empirical fact that, in some circumstances, pretraining with (or preexposure to) stimuli, can facilitate subsequent discrimination between them. I describe experiments (conducted mostly with rats as the subjects) showing how some of these effects can be explained in associative terms. Others, however, seemed to demand an explanation in terms of a new learning process that modulates the effective salience of stimuli. I go on to describe attempts to specify the nature of this process, and (bringing the story up to date) to describe recent experiments investigating the effects of salience modulation in human perceptual learning.

The rapid advances in brain imaging technology over the past 20 years are affording new insights into cortical processing hierarchies in the human brain. These new data provide a complementary front in seeking to understand the links between perceptual and physiological states. Here we review some of the challenges associated with incorporating brain imaging data into such “linking hypotheses,” highlighting some of the considerations needed in brain imaging data acquisition and analysis. We discuss work that has sought to link human brain imaging signals to existing electrophysiological data and opened up new opportunities in studying the neural basis of complex perceptual judgments. We consider a range of approaches when using human functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain circuits whose activity changes in a similar manner to perceptual judgments and illustrate these approaches by discussing work that has studied the neural basis of 3D perception and perceptual learning. Finally, we describe approaches that have sought to understand the information content of brain imaging data using machine learning and work that has integrated multimodal data to overcome the limitations associated with individual brain imaging approaches. Together these approaches provide an important route in seeking to understand the links between physiological and psychological states.

Cerebellar involvement in motor and non-motor sequence learning was examined with serial reaction time tasks (SRT). Our sample consisted of 8 children and adolescents who had undergone surgical removal of a benign posterior fossa tumor (PFT) during childhood. None of them had undergone chemotherapy or cranial radiation therapy (CRT). Ages ranged from 1–11 years at surgery and 9–17 years at testing. The children were tested not earlier than 2.5 years after surgery (M = 5.9 years), enabling brain plasticity and recovery of functions. Their performance was compared with a matched control sample. The PFT group was not impaired in the implicit learning of sequences, as reflected in their performance in blocks with a repeated sequence, both before and after a random block. However, in the perceptual task, their performance deteriorated more than that of the control group when a random block was introduced, suggesting that it was more difficult for the patients to respond flexibly or change their response set when encountering changing task demands. These results are in line with another study by our group on task switching with the same patients. (JINS, 2005, 11, 482–487.)

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes – in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision.

A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing, including, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention-allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, selection, and inference stage, which accesses long-term memory. These two stages provide the primary ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments from computer vision and psychology showing that vision is “intelligent” and involves elements of “problem solving.” The cases of apparently intelligent interpretation sometimes cited in support of this claim do not show cognitive penetration; rather, they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and “hints” are alleged to affect what is seen. In each case it is concluded that the evidence is more readily assimilated to the view that when cognitive effects are found, they have a locus outside early vision, in such processes as the allocation of focal attention and the identification of the stimulus.

According to one productive and influential approach to cognition, categorization, object recognition, and higher level cognitive processes operate on a set of fixed features, which are the output of lower level perceptual processes. In many situations, however, it is the higher level cognitive process being executed that influences the lower level features that are created. Rather than viewing the repertoire of features as being fixed by low-level processes, we present a theory in which people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects. Two types of category learning should be distinguished. Fixed space category learning occurs when new categorizations are representable with the available feature set. Flexible space category learning occurs when new categorizations cannot be represented with the features available. Whether fixed or flexible, learning depends on the featural contrasts and similarities between the new category to be represented and the individual's existing concepts. Fixed feature approaches face one of two problems with tasks that call for new features: If the fixed features are fairly high level and directly useful for categorization, then they will not be flexible enough to represent all objects that might be relevant for a new task. If the fixed features are small, subsymbolic fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at the level of the functional features required to accomplish categorizations will not be captured by these primitives. We present evidence of flexible perceptual changes arising from category learning and theoretical arguments for the importance of this flexibility. We describe conditions that promote feature creation and argue against interpreting them in terms of fixed features. Finally, we discuss the implications of functional features for object categorization, conceptual development, chunking, constructive induction, and formal models of dimensionality reduction.