This article provides a summary of the first comprehensive overview of Japanese youth justice, locating it within wider conceptual considerations of youth justice before outlining its historical development and questioning its uniqueness. It discusses the contested notion of pre-delinquency, its net widening potential, and its place in the wider trends in Japanese youth crime. The study critically assesses the overall organization, administration, and impact of the Family Court (equivalent to youth or juvenile courts) and summarizes recent developments in youth crime policy. The Family Court is the fulcrum of youth justice, but involves many social welfare elements. Despite the increasingly punitive rhetoric, policy, and legislation for juveniles in Japan, there is no evidence that more juvenile offenders are being committed to the adult courts. Overall, we found a clear precedence of social welfare over criminal policy considerations.

The purpose of this study is to show how the Japanese government has created laws with harsher punishment since the 1990s. While a tendency toward harsher punishment is common in advanced Western countries, a similar tendency in Japan has prompted scholarly discussion on whether it can be understood through the “penal-populism” framework. However, it lacks in systematic evidence. This study presents three findings that differ from previous studies through a quantitative analysis of legislation with harsher punishment. First, while previous literature argues that the legislation increased in the latter half of the 1990s, this study shows that it peaked in the middle of the 2000s. Second, while previous literature argues that the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice promote the legislation, this study shows that it is caused by every ministry’s drafting Bills. Third, this study shows that it does not quantitatively avoid partisan conflicts, contrary to the prediction of the “penal-populism” theory.

This article focuses on the war on drugs in the Philippines in order to explore issues related to extra-judicial killing, which remains common in many countries that have abolished the death penalty and in many more that retain it but seldom carry out judicial executions. In the first year of Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–17), thousands of people were killed by police or by vigilantes who were encouraged to prosecute his war on drugs. At a time when democracy is in retreat in many parts of the world, this case illustrates how popular harsh punishment can be in states that have failed to meet their citizens’ hopes for freedom, economic growth, and security.

During the 2015 Maclean’s election debate, Stephen Harper commented, “we have more private member’s legislation that has gone through Parliament under this government than multiple governments before us.” This statement is borne out by empirical evidence: more private member’s bills (PMBs) have become law during Harper’s time in government, compared with most previous parliaments. However, PMBs are subject to less analysis than government bills and do not receive legal scrutiny by the Department of Justice, potentially implicating the protection of rights. Moreover, while one might assume that PMBs concern innocuous local and/or specialized interests, many Harper era PMBs effect substantive legal change to national issues like criminal justice policy. This paper examines the law and order trend in PMBs and addresses the following: why would the PMO under Stephen Harper, noted for its centralized control over all aspects of public policy, permit backbench MPs a role in criminal justice policy, through PMBs?