This chapter takes the approach of quantitative analysis to test the book’s theory: It shows that there is a systematic connection between the domestic institutions and the US ability to attend to its double tasks of maintaining friendly relations while fostering good governance and more respect of human rights. The chapter shows that partner nations with domestic political institutions that allow for more open and competitive political processes of leadership turnover have closer foreign policy alignment with the United States, experience fewer coups, enjoy better governance, and have more respect for human rights than the ones that do not. That is the case both among democracies and autocracies: in parliamentary democracies more than in presidential democracies; in autocracies with multiparty legislatures than in autocracies with personalist leaders or single-party legislatures.

This chapter delves into US relations with the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. The chapter describes the idiosyncratic processes that led Afghanistan to have presidential institutions and Iraq to have parliamentary institutions. It then shows how the different constitutional arrangements in Afghanistan and Iraq changed the dynamics through which the United States interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in the two countries. It analyzes the extent to which the United States was able to exercise leverage over the incumbent leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, given their different constitutional frameworks.

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the book. It shows that the conundrum of a consensual world order can be disentangled by analyzing the mechanisms through which incumbents and potential challengers can gain and maintain power. For the United States, the fundamental challenge is to channel the political ambitions of potential successor leaders toward good governance and respect of human rights while avoiding becoming entangled with any specific incumbent in partner nations. Domestic political institutions that foster political successors and allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover make it easier for the United States to attain friendly relations by easing more accommodating leaders into power. In a special twist, institutions that allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover also create domestic political incentives that foster the attainment of better governance and more respect of human rights. In contrast, domestic political institutions that concentrate power in the hands of the incumbents, and curtail political competition, make it more difficult for the United States to exercise influence.

This chapter places the book’s theory into a historical perspective: It describes several ways in which the United States has interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in partner nations. From this, the chapter identifies and operationalizes the mechanisms of the book’s theory in respect to the domestic politics of partner countries, differentiating between democratic and authoritarian partners. The chapter also operationalizes four dimensions of the relations between the United States and its partners: (a) the alignment of the foreign policies of the United States and the partner nations’; (b) the likelihood of coups in the partner nations; (c) good governance through the provision of public goods; and (d) the respect of human rights. This chapter, therefore, sets the stage for the systematic empirical analysis of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

The Bengal delta now became part of Pakistan, a uniquely complex post-colonial state: founded upon religious nationalism; administering two discrete territories, separated from each other by about 1,500 km of Indian terrain; and not heir to any of the colony’s central state institutions. Tensions between West and East Pakistan immediately surfaced. East Pakistani grievances crystallised around the question of the national language (Urdu or Bengali), leading to the language movement. After a decade the army stepped in, establishing a military dictatorship that would dominate the remaining years of ‘united Pakistan’.

Bangladesh was under military rule from 1975 to 1990 when a popular uprising toppled the dictator and restored parliamentary democracy. Since then elections have been held regularly and the political system has been dominated by two parties with charismatic leaders. Despite recurring elections, however, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is not democratically ruled. The power elite of this society of 170 million people is remarkably small and surprisingly connected by family ties, even across party lines. Each time, a tight-knit coterie of familiar power holders comes out on top.

Looking back from 2018, Bulgaria has turned into a country substantially different from the Soviet satellite it was in 1989. Today, the country is a member both of NATO and of the European Union, and it has a stable democracy and a functioning market economy. The authors explore Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, democracy-building through party transformation, and institutional changes. The chapter follows up on the birth and development of civil society and the challenges to media freedom. Bulgaria’s transformation went through the process of dismantling of the pre-1990 one-party state and the establishment of a multiparty democracy, liberal society, and a market economy while the state gradually adopted European norms, policies, and practices. The text opens up for discussion current political issues such as the safeguarding of minority and refugee rights, the fight against corruption and organized crime, and the inequitable distribution of the country’s wealth. The biggest concern in the social and political landscape recently is the decreasing fairness of the electoral process. Heavy social dependencies and insufficient incomes in the country are consciously sustained by the political elites to facilitate their maintenance of incumbency. Nevertheless, Bulgaria has not seen any of the violent conflicts that have afflicted the rest of Southeastern Europe.