Two perspectives on the nature of nurture are reviewed, one Mendelian and the other Darwinian, in an effort to draw links between the two and, thereby, integrate them in a developmental modern synthesis, mirroring the one that took place in biology early in the last century. Thus, the heritability of environmental measures and gene-X-environment interaction are discussed with respect to Mendelian nature before turning attention to Darwinian nature and thus the development of reproductive strategies and differential susceptibility to environmental influences. Conclusions are drawn with respect to both frameworks indicating that it is time to abandon the biology-is-destiny resistance to both approaches to studying and thinking about development, especially when it comes to the nature of nurture. Implications for the future development of the field of developmental psychopathology are highlighted.

Using Kahneman and Tversky’s life-death decision paradigm, Wang and colleagues (e.g., Wang & Johnston, 1995; Wang, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2008; Wang et al., 2001) have shown two characteristic phenomena regarding people’s attitude to risk when the contextual group size is manipulated. In both positive and negative frames, people tend to take greater risks in life-death decisions as the contextual group size becomes smaller; this risk-seeking attitude is greater when framed positively than negatively. (This second characteristic often leads to the disappearance of the framing effect in small group contexts comprising of 6 or 60 people.) Their results could shed new light on the effect of contextual group size on people’s risk choice. However these results are usually observed in laboratory experiments with university student samples. This study aims to examine the external validity of these results through different ways of experimentation and with a different sample base. The first characteristic was replicated in both a face-to-face interview with a randomly selected sample of the Japanese general public, and a web-based experiment with a non-student sample, but not the second.

Food insecurity has been associated with poor diet, but few studies focused on the postpartum period – an important time for women’s health. We examined associations between food security and diet quality in postpartum women and assessed whether participation in federal food assistance programmes modified this potential relation. Using longitudinal data, we analysed the association between food security at 3 months postpartum and a modified Alternate Healthy Eating Index-2010 (AHEI) at 6 months postpartum (excluding alcohol). We conducted multivariable linear regressions examining associations between food security and AHEI. We assessed two food assistance programmes as potential effect modifiers. The sample included 363 postpartum women from the Nurture study, located in the Southeastern USA (2013–2017). Among women, 64·4 % were Black and 45·7 % had a high school diploma or less. We found no evidence of an interaction between food security and two federal food assistance programmes. In adjusted models, marginal, low and very low food security were not associated with AHEI. However, low (β: −0·64; 95 % CI −1·15, −0·13; P = 0·01) and very low (β: −0·57; 95 % CI −1·02, −0·13; P = 0·01) food security were associated with greater trans fat intake. Food security status was not associated with overall diet quality but was associated with higher trans fat (low and very low) and more moderate alcohol (marginal) intake. Future studies should assess the consistency and generalisability of these findings.

The ancestry sections in Suetonius’ Lives of the Caesars demonstrate the inheritance of character traits down the family line. The effectiveness of this as a rhetorical technique rests on an expectation of inheritance and resemblance along the family line. This study investigates the mechanism of that resemblance from the evidence available in Suetonius’ text—nature or nurture?—and then proposes that since the mechanism appears to be not quite the same as that evidenced in earlier writers, the biographer's model of inheritance and degeneration is part of a conversation about succession to the principate. Part one sets out the patterns of resemblance/difference that appear from the lists of ancestors, part two the evidence for nature and nurture of character traits in Suetonius’ Lives, and part three compares the way resemblance works in Suetonius with the way it works in other authors. As modern views on nature and nurture have changed with social and political changes, the final section proposes that the changes over the first century of the principate have to do with the political and social changes in that period. Suetonius’ model of hereditary vice, not hereditary virtue, arises from a disaffection with the system of hereditary succession.

I recount early formative experiences with my father, Nick Martin.

Evidence for genetic influence on environmental measures will emerge in quantitative genetic analyses if genetically influenced characteristics of individuals are assessed by these environmental measures. Recent twin and adoption studies indicate substantial genetic influence when measures of the environment are treated as phenotypes in genetic analyses. Genetic influence has been documented for measures as diverse as videotaped observations of parental behavior toward their children, ratings by parents and children of their family environment, and ratings of peer groups, social support, and life events. Evidence for genetic influence on environmental measures includes some of the most widely used measures of environment – the Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment, the Family Environment Scales, and the Social Readjustment Rating Scale of life events, for example. The goal of this article is to document and discuss these findings and to elicit commentary that might help to shape the course of research on this topic, which has far-reaching implications for the behavioral and brain sciences.

As part of my interest in the persistence of unproductive debates about the relative importance of nature and nurture, I focus here on the especially problematic relation between nature and the natural. For if the definition of nature is problematic, its semantic relation to ‘natural’ is even more so. I explore some of the problems that arise from slippage between substantive and normative conceptions of ‘natural’ (inviting collateral slippage between is and ought), from the bifurcatory structure of its negation and from changing assumptions about nature’s domain.