A little more than fifteen years ago an exchange between David West and Isaiah Berlin concerning Spinoza's "positive conception of liberty" was published in Political Studies. West aimed to rescue Spinoza from Berlin's procrustean critique of positive liberty by pointing to liberal features of Spinoza's thought, such as his methodological individualism and his defense of toleration. This chapter explains why exactly does not Spinoza think that we should attempt to snuff out irrationality and dissolution with the law's iron fist. It intensifies the problem by noting several features of Spinoza's thought that lead him to eschew skeptical, pluralistic, and rights-based arguments for toleration, and make his defense of toleration even more surprising. The chapter delineates the prudential, anticlerical roots of Spinoza's defense. It then considers just how far and when toleration serves the guiding norms of governance, namely, peace and positive liberty.