Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • Group Belief: The Cognitive Non-Summative Account

  • Mohammad Shokri
  • Journal:
    Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie / Volume 63 / Issue 3 / December 2024
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 January 2025, pp. 497-512
    • Article
      • You have access
      • Open access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation

  • This article concerns the criteria for when a group can collectively hold a belief. By proposing a cognitive non-summative account of group belief (GB), I highlight three necessary features at the individual level: commonality, mutuality, and group-based considerations. My account asserts that group G believes proposition p if and only if a sufficient majority of its members believe (1) pG, where pG is “Given some G-based considerations, p,” and (2) “the majority of G also believe that pG.” The article critiques three significant accounts of GB: Anthony Quinton's simple summative account, Margaret Gilbert's and Raimo Tuomela's conative non-summative views, and Jennifer Lackey's modified summativism.